U.S. v. Goelet, 232 U.S. 293 (1914) and U.S. v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1914)
CASE LINKS:
- U.S. v. Goelet, 232 U.S. 293 (1914)
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6688960919852572593 - U.S. v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1914)
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16108812717442094384
SIGNIFICANCE:
These two cases present the question of whether the constitutional power of excise taxation over property located outside United States the country applies in two scenarios:
- “Citizen of the United StatesG” taxpayer domiciled WITHOUT the United States in the case of U.S. v. Goelet, 232 U.S. 293 (1914)
- “Citizen of the United StatesG” taxpayer domiciled WITHIN the United States in the case of U.S. v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1914)
The court decided that the domiciled taxpayer was liable and the taxpayer with the foreign domicile was not liable. The circumstances of the Goelet case most closely resemble the famous case of Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) later in 1924, in which the supreme court declared that Cook, who also had a foreign domicile, was subject to the income tax. The reason was because he ELECTED “citizen of the United StatesG” status on his 1920 income tax return. Otherwise, he, like Goelet above, would not be liable.
From these to comparative cases, we can see that the origin of the tax liability was “domicile within the United StatesG“. However, WHICH “United States” was never fully defined. We allege that it could only be territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. The separation of powers doctrine forbids a CIVIL “united States” domicile within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state. Income taxation is a subject matter jurisdiction within a state under Article 1, Section 8 of thee Constitution, and thus is not territorial or even civil and does not depend on domicile within that state.
The “citizen of the United StatesG” or “U.S. person” election in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(a) and (b) behaves more like an agent of Uncle Sam with a domicile in the District of Columbia per 4 U.S.C. §72 for whom a NONRESIDENT is the representative domiciled or residing within the constitutional states is the surety, as confirmed by 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(39) and 26 U.S.C. §7408(d). Thus, it behaves similar to OTHER statutory entities you register in a constitutional state with the Secretary of State. Such entities include mainly LLCs and corporations domiciled in the state. In order to complete the registration process of fictions within a constitutional state, a “resident agent” must be designated domiciled or residing physically within the borders of the constitutional state as a political body. The main difference between state and federal entities in the case of taxation is that the agent for state fictions must be a “RESIDENT AGENT” while the agent for the “U.S. person” fictional entity must be a “NONRESIDENT agent” with a foreign domicile or residence within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state.
The Bennett case did, however, invoke the same language about “benefits” that Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) did in its ruling, which was written by former President William Howard Taft who later became Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court:
But it is said in the decided cases relied upon, the principle which was announced 307*307 was that the power to tax was limited by the capacity of the taxing government to afford that benefit and protection which is the true basis of the right to tax and which causes, therefore, taxation where such capacity to confer benefit and afford protection does not exist to be a mere arbitrary and unwarranted burden. But here again the confusion of thought consists in mistaking the scope and extent of the sovereign power of the United States as a nation and its relation to its citizens and their relations to it. It presumes that government does not by its very nature benefit the citizen and his property wherever found. Indeed, the argument, while holding on to citizenship, belittles and destroys its advantages and blessings by denying the possession by government of an essential power required to make citizenship completely beneficial.
[U.S. v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 306-307 (1914)
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16108812717442094384]
These two cases therefore establish that you can’t have a civil status in a place without an election or a domicile. Since domicile is such an election, then its really about consent and election. AND, you can’t have a domicile in a place you have NEVER physically BEEN and don’t intend to reside in. An election ABSENT a domicile is a FRAUD. So you have to be domiciled in the SAME place as the domicile of the election, or no status can lawfully be created by your consent.
This issue is CRITICAL to challenging taxation of INVOLUNTARY RESIDENT ALIENS. CRITICAL. The reason its critical is exposed in:
Microsoft Copilot: Are aliens standing on constitutionally protected land protected from direct taxes on private property in Article 1, Section 2. Clause 3?, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/microsoft-copilot-are-aliens-standing-on-constitutionally-protected-land-protected-from-direct-taxes-on-private-property-in-article-1-section-2-clause-3/