REFERENCE: Sovereignty Hierarchy of Allegiance and Tax Identification
This unified table summarize and illustrates how the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and 26 CFR 301.6109-1 only “capture” the Alien Individual (Resident) through the ITIN system, while the Nonresident Alien remains a sovereign entity under the Law of Nations and the Neutrality Act and a pure IRNA is not eligible for a number.
The Sovereign Hierarchy of Allegiance and Tax Identification
| Category | Tax Status (IRC) | Legal Identity | Type of Allegiance | Regulatory Number | Source of Authority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| National of the United States | Citizen of the United States or National of the United States | INA 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(22) | Permanent | social security number | Naturalization, born under federal common law jus soli |
| Resident Alien | “Alien Individual” | INA 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(3), 26 C.F.R. §301.6109-1 | None (Contractual) | ITIN Assigned | Statutory Grant & Privilege |
| Nonresident Alien(state citizen) | Individual who is a NRA | “Citizen” (in Art), 22 U.S.C. §456(f), 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(B) | Temporary | No Number Assigned to a pure INRA and foreign person( 26 C.F.R. §301.6109-1(b)(2)(iv). | Law of Nations(LON) / Neutrality Act/ 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(B). Not an INA Alien, but instead a LON Alien |
| Transient Alien | N/A | INA 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(3) | None | No Number | Plenary Power (Exclusionary) |
Profound Conclusions for the Reader:
- The ITIN Attachment: The IRS assigns the ITIN specifically to the “Alien Individual” under 26 C.F.R. §301.6109-1. This person is the INA 101(a)(3) alien who has traded sovereignty for the “grant and privilege” of residency. They follow U.S. laws by force of regulation, not by the bond of allegiance.
- The NRA as “Citizen”: Per 22 U.S.C. §456(f) and the Neutrality Act of 1939, a Nonresident Alien (NRA) is a “citizen” in the sense that they owe temporary allegiance while under U.S. protection. Because they are not “Permanent Nationals” and have not accepted the “Grant” of residency, they are not “Alien Individuals” and fall outside the mandatory numbering system.
- The Sovereignty Gap: A complete NRA is an “individual who is a nonresident alien.” As they owe no permanent allegiance and are not statutory “inhabitants,” they remain under the Law of Nations (Vattel/Blackstone). Under Coyle v. Smith, the federal government cannot diminish this residual sovereignty by forcing state citizens into a domestic tax-ID system.
- Jurisdiction: The government owes no protection to the Resident (Alien Individual) as a right, as their status is a mere privilege. Conversely, the NRA/Law of Nations (LON) Citizen receives protection in exchange for temporary allegiance, maintaining their status as a sovereign peer rather than a statutory subject.
“Residents, as distinguished from citizens, are aliens who are permitted to take up a permanent abode in the country. Being bound to the society by reason of their dwelling in it, they are subject to its laws so long as they remain there, and, being protected by it, they must defend it, although they do not enjoy all the rights of citizens. They have only certain privileges which the law, or custom, gives them. Permanent residents are those who have been given the right of perpetual residence. They are a sort of citizen of a less privileged character, and are subject to the society without enjoying all its advantages. Their children succeed to their status; for the right of perpetual residence given them by the State passes to their children.”
[The Law of Nations, Vattel, Book 1, Chapter 19, Section 213, p. 87]
U.S. Supreme Court on temporary allegiance above:
The reasons for not allowing to other aliens exemption ‘from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found’ were stated as follows: ‘When private individuals of one nation [states of the Unions are “nations” under the law of nations] spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign countries are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently, there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter, can never be construed to grant such exemption.’ 7 Cranch, 144.
In short, the judgment in the case of The Exchange declared, as incontrovertible principles, that the jurisdiction of every nation within its own territory is exclusive and absolute, and is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the nation itself; that all exceptions to its full and absolute territorial jurisdiction must be traced up to its own consent, express or implied; that upon its consent to cede, or to waive the exercise of, a part of its territorial jurisdiction, rest the exemptions from that jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns or their armies entering its territory with its permission, and of their foreign ministers and public ships of war; and that the implied license, under which private individuals of another nation enter the territory and mingle indiscriminately with its inhabitants, for purposes of business or pleasure, can never be construed to grant to them an exemption from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found. See, also, Carlisle v. U. S. (1872) 16 Wall. 147, 155 ; Radich v. Hutchins (1877) 95 U. S. 210 ; Wildenhus’ Case (1887) 120 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 385 ; Chae Chan Ping v. U. S. (1889) 130 U. S. 581, 603, 604, 9 Sup. Ct. 623.
[United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3381955771263111765]