PROOF OF FACTS: That I.R.C. Subtitles A and C are NOT a CONSTITUTIONAL income tax but a CIVIL PRIVILEGE tax
FACT:
The tax described in Internal Revenue Code Subtitles A and C is NOT a “income tax” described in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 or the Sixteenth Amendment provisions of the Constitution. Instead, it is a tax upon legislatively created CIVIL privileges as PUBLIC property owned by Congress.
PROOF:
1. The CIVIL STATUTORY tax described in Internal Revenue Code Subtitles A and C is a tax upon PRIVILEGES as PUBLIC property, not RIGHTS as PRIVATE property:
Duties and imposts are terms commonly applied to levies made by governments on the importation or exportation of commodities. Excises are “taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, and upon corporate privileges.” Cooley, Const. Lim., 7th ed., 680.
The tax under consideration, as we have construed the statute, may be described as an excise upon the particular privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity, i.e., with the advantages which arise from corporate or quasi-corporate organization; or, when applied to insurance companies, for doing the business of such companies. As was said in the Thomas Case, 192 U.S. 363 supra, the requirement to pay such taxes involves the exercise of 152*152 privileges, and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand is lacking. If business is not done in the manner described in the statute, no tax is payable.
[Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. 107, 151-152 (1911);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17853944152368373401]
2. A tax upon “PRIVILEGES” as PUBLIC property legislatively created by Congress is NOT, strictly speaking, an “income tax” in the context of of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 or the Sixteenth Amendment provisions of the Constitution:
“Evidently Congress adopted the income tax as the measure of the tax to be imposed with respect to the doing of business in corporate form because it desired that the excise should be imposed, approximately at least, with regard to the amount of benefit presumably derived by such corporations from the current operations of the government. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107, 165, 55 S.L. ed. 107, 419, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 1312, it was held that Congress, in exercising the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as a franchise or privilege, was not debarred by the Constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income, although derived in part from property which, considered by itself, was not taxable. It was reasonable that Congress should fix upon gross income, without distinction as to source, as a convenient and sufficiently accurate index of the importance of the business transacted.”
[. . .]
“As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to be and is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. This court had decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to populations, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation, with certain qualifications prescribed by the act itself. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107 , 55 L. ed. 389, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1312; McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co. 228 U.S. 295 , 57 L. ed. 842, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419; United States v. Whiteridge (decided at this term, 231 U.S. 144 , 58 L. ed. –, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24.” Stratton’s, supra at 414
[Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, at 416-417 (1913); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11971357151204259952]
3. Because the tax described in Internal Revenue Code Subtitles A and C is a privilege tax upon PRIVILEGES as PUBLIC property , the Constitution is IRRELEVANT in the determination of the amount due, and whether the tax is DIRECT or INDIRECT in a CONSTITUTIONAL sense. It is a charge or fee for the use of PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT property legislatively created by Congress that can only therefore derive its authority from Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution and functions as a PUBLIC PROPERTY RENTAL arrangement.
United States Constitution
Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 Territory and Other PropertyThe Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
[SOURCE: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-4/section-3/clause-2]
4. Operating in a privileged capacity by receiving the BENEFITS of a civil status legislatively created and owned by Congress as PUBLIC property is called “domestic” in the Internal Revenue Code:
26 U.S. Code § 7701 – Definitions
(a)When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—
(4)Domestic
The term “domestic” when applied to a corporation or partnership means created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any State unless, in the case of a partnership, the Secretary provides otherwise by regulations.
A “privilege tax” therefore limits itself by implication to those who make a “domestic election” in filing a “resident” tax return, such as a 1040 or to those using or benefitting from DOMESTIC public property.
5. Those making a “domestic election” are what the U.S. Supreme Court refers to as operating in a “quasi-corporate” capacity. The United States government is a federal corporation and those acting as its agents or contractors are operating in such a capacity:
“The tax under consideration, as we have construed the statute, may be described as an excise upon the particular privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity, i.e., with the advantages which arise from corporate or quasi-corporate organization; or, when applied to insurance companies, for doing the business of such companies. As was said in the Thomas Case, 192 U.S. 363 supra, the requirement to pay such taxes involves the exercise of 152*152 privileges, and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand is lacking. If business is not done in the manner described in the statute, no tax is payable.
[Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. 107, 151-152 (1911);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17853944152368373401]
6. “Income” as used in the CONSTITUTION cannot be legislatively defined by Congress. The Constitution defines it as PROFIT rather than GROSS RECEIPTS.
In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from Article I of the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the Amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not “income,” as the term is there used; and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.
The fundamental relation of “capital” to “income” has been much discussed by economists, the former being likened to the tree or the land, the latter to the fruit or the crop; the former depicted as a reservoir supplied from springs, the latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow during a period of time. For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term “income,” 207*207 as used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the Amendment; and, having formed also a correct judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide the matter at issue.
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L.D.; Standard Dict.; Webster’s Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185) — “”Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,” provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case (pp. 183, 185).
[Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-207 (1920); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6666969430777270424]
7. A tax on “income” in a CONSTITUTIONAL sense is an indirect excise tax.
“As repeatedly pointed out by this court, the Corporation Tax Law of 1909..imposed an excise or privilege tax, and not in any sense, a tax upon property or upon income merely as income. It was enacted in view of the decision of Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & T. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 29 L. Ed. 759, 15 Sup. St. Rep. 673, 158 U.S. 601, 39 L. Ed. 1108, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912, which held the income tax provisions of a previous law to be unconstitutional because amounting in effect to a direct tax upon property within the meaning of the Constitution, and because not apportioned in the manner required by that instrument.”
[U.S. v. Whiteridge, 231 U.S. 144, 147, 34 S.Sup. Ct. 24 (1913); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4718404847965333552]
“Moreover in addition the conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and necessarily came within the class 17*17 of direct taxes on property, but on the contrary recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing the result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to disregard form and consider substance alone and hence subject the tax to the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise would not apply to it. ”
[Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1916); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5893140094506516673]
8. “Income” has been further defined in a CIVIL and not CONSTITUTIONAL sense by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows:
“The Sixteenth Amendment declares that Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes on income, “from [271 U.S. 174] whatever source derived,” without apportionment among the several states and without regard to any census or enumeration. It was not the purpose or effect of that amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing power. Congress already had power to tax all incomes. But taxes on incomes from some sources had been held to be “direct taxes” within the meaning of the constitutional requirement as to apportionment. Art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, § 9, cl. 4; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601. The Amendment relieved from that requirement, and obliterated the distinction in that respect between taxes on income that are direct taxes and those that are not, and so put on the same basis all incomes “from whatever source derived.” Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17. “Income” has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth Amendment, and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed. Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335; Merchants’ L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 219. After full consideration, this Court declared that income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital. Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207. And that definition has been adhered to and applied repeatedly. See, e.g., Merchants’ L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, supra; 518; Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 535; United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 169; Miles v. Safe Deposit Co., 259 U.S. 247, 252-253; United States v. Supplee-Biddle Co., 265 U.S. 189, 194; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 167; Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628, 633. In determining what constitutes income, substance rather than form is to be given controlling weight. Eisner v. Macomber, supra, 206. [271 U.S. 175]”
[Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 173-174, (1926); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9246029933485828434]
The Sixteenth Amendment mentioned above is a RED HERRING, because:
- The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixteenth Amendment conferred “no new taxing powers”.
“But aside from the obvious error of the proposition intrinsically considered, it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged and being placed 113*113 in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it was — a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the income taxed.
[Stanton v. Baltic Mining, 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1916); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=726253341774342162] - If Congress cannot define “income” in a CONSTITUTIONAL sense, they can’t define GROSS INCOME or PROFIT either as they have done in the Internal Revenue Code. All they would have to do to negate the constitutional definition of “income” is define “PROFIT” as everything you make.
9. Congress CAN, however, DEFINITELY define both “INCOME” and “GROSS INCOME” when the ONLY thing subject to the tax is the use of PUBLIC property in the form of civil statutory statuses they legislatively created, such as “U.S. citizen”, “U.S. resident”, “taxpayer”, “person”, etc. But such a tax is NOT upon PRIVATE human beings, but rather the GOVERNMENT itself, or more particularly, those operating in a privileged capacity as its agents and officers. What could be better than a tax upon ONLY the government?
“In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under Art. I, sec. 8, giving to Congress the power “to lay and collect taxes, imposts and excises,” which “shall be uniform throughout the United States,” inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States. It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States.“
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 260 (1901);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9926302819023946834]
A tax upon ONLY the government and its property is exactly what President Taft described the Sixteenth Amendment as when he proposed it to Congress:
I therefore recommend to the Congress that both Houses, by a two-thirds vote, shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring the power to levy an income tax upon the National Government without apportionment among the States in proportion to population.
[CONGRESSIONAL RECORD – SENATE – JUNE 16, 1909, From Pages 3344 – 3345]
Taft could have said “shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring upon the national government the power to levy an income tax” but DID NOT state it more correctly this way.
10. Congress has in fact defined “gross income” in the context of human beings serving in civil offices such as CIVIL “citizens[**+D] of the United StatesGOV” or “residents of the United StatesGOV) (26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(a) and (b)), and nonresident aliens (26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(B)) to mean GROSS RECEIPTS instead of merely “profit” as required by Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 or the Sixteenth Amendment provisions of the Constitution. So the tax in the case of these parties is NOT a constitutional tax but a rental fee for the use of their PUBLIC civil statuses they legislatively created and therefore own.
26 U.S. Code § 61 – Gross income defined
(a)General definition
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Annuities;
(9) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(10) Pensions;
(11) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(12) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(13) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(14) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
11. Because the CONSTITUTION at Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 or the Sixteenth Amendment is IRRELEVANT as the authority for the Internal Revenue Code Subtitles A and C tax, judges can truthfully but deceptively call it a DIRECT, UNAPPORTIONED tax upon ownership of property, as long as they don’t IDENTIFY the owner of the property, which is THE GOVERNMENT and not YOU. And in fact, that is exactly what they are DECEPTIVELY doing:
“There is consensus on certain basic principles, in addition to the rule that the United States notion of income taxes furnishes the controlling guide. All are agreed that an income tax is a direct tax on gain or profits, and that gain is a necessary ingredient of income. See Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 34 S.Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. 285 (1931); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493 (1916); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920); Keasbey Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d. 894, 897 (C.A.3), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739, 64 S.Ct. 39, 88 L.Ed. 438 (1943). Income, including gross income, must be distinguished from gross receipts which can cover returns of capital. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185, 38 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed. 1054 (1918); Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d. 409, 414, 190 Ct.Cl. 19, 27 (1969); 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 5.10 at 35-36 (1969). Only an “income tax”, not a tax which is truly on gross receipts, is creditable.”
[Bank of America Nat. T. S. Ass’n v. U.S., 459 F.2d. 513, 517-18 (Fed. Cir. 1972); https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12199037144535776358]
You can see a demonstration of exactly how the deceptive abuse of “direct tax” is employed above by reading the following:
Microsoft Copilot: Is the income tax a DIRECT tax or an INDIRECT tax?, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/microsoft-copilot-is-the-income-tax-a-direct-tax-or-an-indirect-tax/
12. The Public Rights Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that those who invoke the BENEFITS of a civil statutory status (such as “taxpayer”, “citizen”, “resident”) IMPLICITLY waive constitutional protections and thus, make Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 or the Sixteenth Amendment provisions of the Constitution IRRELEVANT as standing to sue for an injury to PRIVATE rights or PRIVATE property.
“The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:
[. . .]
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.FN7 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U.S. 581, 8 S.Ct. 631, 31 L.Ed. 527; Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407, 411, 412, 37 S.Ct. 609, 61 L.Ed. 1229; St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. Prendergast Construction Co., 260 U.S. 469, 43 S.Ct. 178, 67 L.Ed. 351.
__________________
FOOTNOTES:
[Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17743531891216865789]
The implications of the Public Rights Doctrine are that:
- The word “rights” in the phrase “public rights” they are talking about are PUBLIC property legislatively created by Congress and therefore “domestic” per 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(4). All rights are property.
- Everything attached to the office or status you invoke is PUBLIC property.
- You are acting as a privileged agent of Congress in invoking a civil statutory to your benefit.
- The constitutional protections of private property such as the limitation of no direct taxes upon GROSS RECEIPTS of PRIVATE property DO NOT APPLY, because no PRIVATE property is involved in connection with PUBLIC civil statuses they create or own or anything attached to them.
- Whatever you voluntarily attach to the CIVIL office or status of “person”, “citizen”, or “resident” (which are PUBLIC property) becomes PRIVATE property donated to procure the BENEFITS of a franchise or privilege.
More on the above doctrine at:
Catalog of U.S. Supreme Court Doctrines, Litigation Tool #10.020, Section 5.3
https://sedm.org/Litigation/10-PracticeGuides/SCDoctrines.pdf
13. Everything entered on the 1040 form is connected with the “trade or business” excise taxable privilege under 26 U.S.C. §162. The earnings entered on the form are ALL connected with USPI:
26 U.S. Code § 7701 – Definitions
(a)When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—
(26)Trade or business
The term “trade or business” includes the performance of the functions of a public office.
26 U.S. Code § 162 – Trade or business expenses
(a)In general
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including—
14. Even the earnings NOT connected to the “trade or business” excise taxable privilege on the Schedule NEC under 26 U.S.C. §871(a) are ALSO privileged by virtue of being earned ONLY by privileged aliens. Everything on the form is connected to PRIVILEGED “treaty benefits” available only to aliens in the COUNTRY “United States*”. American nationals whoa are not privileged cannot even complete this form.
The reasons for not allowing to other aliens exemption ‘from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found’ were stated as follows: ‘When private individuals of one nation [states of the Unions are “nations” under the law of nations] spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign countries are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently, there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter, can never be construed to grant such exemption.’ 7 Cranch, 144.
In short, the judgment in the case of The Exchange declared, as incontrovertible principles, that the jurisdiction of every nation within its own territory is exclusive and absolute, and is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the nation itself; that all exceptions to its full and absolute territorial jurisdiction must be traced up to its own consent, express or implied; that upon its consent to cede, or to waive the exercise of, a part of its territorial jurisdiction, rest the exemptions from that jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns or their armies entering its territory with its permission, and of their foreign ministers and public ships of war; and that the implied license, under which private individuals of another nation enter the territory and mingle indiscriminately with its inhabitants, for purposes of business or pleasure, can never be construed to grant to them an exemption from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found. See, also, Carlisle v. U. S. (1872) 16 Wall. 147, 155 ; Radich v. Hutchins (1877) 95 U. S. 210 ; Wildenhus’ Case (1887) 120 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 385 ; Chae Chan Ping v. U. S. (1889) 130 U. S. 581, 603, 604, 9 Sup. Ct. 623.
[United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 685-686, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3381955771263111765]
The term “implied license” as used above is a marker of privilege.
15. Consistent with the above, there is NO LIABILITY statute for those on whom the tax is imposed in 26 U.S.C. §1 and 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1. Thus, merely claiming these statuses on a government form or invoking the benefits of the statuses are, alone, sufficient as the origin of the obligations also attached to these civil statuses.
15.1. The only liability indicated anywhere is that found in 26 U.S.C. §1461 pertaining to withholding agents o privileged aliens only.
15.2. The phrase “liable to” in 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1 is not equivalent to “made liable”.
16. The U.S. Supreme Court described the offering of government services as a “concession”, meaning a SALE as a Merchant under U.C.C. 1-204(1) to you as the Buyer under U.C.C. 1-203(1)(a).
“It is only where some right or privilege [PUBLIC property, either TANGIBLE or INTANGIBLE] is conferred by the government or municipality upon the owner, which he can use in connection with his property, or by means of which the use of his property is rendered more valuable to him, or he thereby enjoys an advantage over others, that the compensation to be received by him becomes a legitimate matter of regulation [or, by implication TAXATION]. Submission to the regulation [or taxation] of compensation in such cases is an implied condition 147*147 of the grant [RENTAL of PUBLIC property or service for a fee], and the State, in exercising its power of prescribing the compensation, only determines the conditions upon which its concession shall be enjoyed. When the privilege ends, the power of regulation ceases.
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 146-147 (1877);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]
The implication of the above is that you have a right to NOT be a “buyer” of anything they offer and by rejecting their services or privileges, you may lawfully avoid paying “taxes” for them. Excises are merely the fees or taxes that PAY for such a “CONCESSION”:
Concession
3 a : a small business or shop where things are sold in a public place (such as a sports stadium or theater)
The theater had real Raisinets at the concession, so I got some of those, too.—Neal Fandek
… Billie’s visiting with her father, and I’m standing alone at the concession stand, buying my butterless corn.—Carrie Fisher
b concessions plural : things sold at such a business
Spectators spend an average of $5 per game on concessions.—Jack Gallagher
[Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary; SOURCE: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concession]
17. It is a maxim of the common law that you cannot be held accountable to pay a tax where the government has provided no “benefit”. By “benefit” we mean PRIVILEGE, which is synonymous with PUBLIC property:
“A person is ordinarily not required to pay for benefits which were thrust upon him with no opportunity to refuse them. The fact that he is enriched is not enough, if he cannot avoid the enrichment.” Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 Vand. L. Rev. at 1198 (1966). [Siskron v. Temel-Peck Enterprises, 26 N.C.App. 387, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975)]
“Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto. Any one may renounce a law [including a CIVIL FRANCHISE statute] introduced for his own benefit.”
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856;
SOURCE: https://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]
“The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civilized government, is exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person and property, in adding to the value of such property, or in the creation and maintenance of public conveniences in which he shares, such, for instance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools for the education of his children. If the taxing power be in no position to render these services, or otherwise to benefit the person or property taxed, and such property be wholly within the taxing power of another State, to which it may be said to owe an allegiance and to which it looks for protection, the taxation of such property within the domicil of the owner partakes rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax, and has been repeatedly held by this court to be beyond the power of the legislature and a taking of property without due process of law. Railroad Company v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262; State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Tappan v. Merchants’ National Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 499; Delaware &c. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341, 358. In Chicago &c. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, it was held, after full consideration, that the taking of private property 203*203 without compensation was a denial of due process within the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417; Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Massachusetts, 509, 519.”
[Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 202-203 (1905);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14163786757633929654]
18. Corrupt governments CIRCUMVENT these limitations of you only paying for what you use or ask for by bundling those eligible to receive them into a single status and FORCING you to pay for ALL things that are part of the bundle including things you don’t want. This results in an unconscionable adhesion contract. The obligation to pay then attaches to the CIVIL STATUTORY STATUS of “citizen”, “resident”, and “person”, which represent MEMBERSHIP that the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes as a SURRENDER OF RIGHTS and CONSTITUTIONAL protections:
When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. “A body politic,” as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, “is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and 125*125 has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, “are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things.”
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-125 (1877);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931&q=munn+v.+illinois&hl=en&as_sdt=2006]
Most modern legislation upon this subject has been directed (1) to the requirement that every citizen shall disclose the amount of his property subject to taxation and shall contribute in proportion to such amount; and (2) to the voidance of double taxation. As said by Adam Smith in his “Wealth of Nations,” Book V., Ch. 2, Pt. 2, “the subjects of every State ought to contribute towards the support of the Government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State. The expense of Government to the individuals of a great nation is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interest in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called equality or inequality of taxation.”
But notwithstanding the rule of uniformity lying at the basis of every just system of taxation, there are doubtless many individual cases where the weight of a tax falls unequally upon the owners of the property taxed. This is almost unavoidable under every system of direct taxation. But the tax is not rendered illegal by such discrimination. Thus every citizen is bound to pay his proportion of a school tax, though he have no children; of a police tax, though he have no buildings or personal property to be guarded; or of a road tax, though he never use the road. In other words, a general tax cannot be dissected to show that, as to certain constituent parts, the taxpayer receives no benefit. Even in case of special assessments imposed for the improvement of property within certain limits, the fact that it is extremely doubtful whether a particular lot can receive any benefit from the improvement does not invalidate the tax with respect to such lot. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 204*204 104 U.S. 78; Amesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed, 17 Massachusetts, 53; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264; Louisville &c. R.R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Co., 197 U.S. 430. Subject to these individual exceptions, the rule is that in classifying property for taxation some benefit to the property taxed is a controlling consideration, and a plain abuse of this power will sometimes justify a judicial interference. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269. It is often said protection and payment of taxes are correlative obligations.
[Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 203-204 (1905); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14163786757633929654]
19. The result is that the “state” functions as the equivalent of a PRIVATE membership association for consenting members called “citizens” and “residents” ONLY. Those who aren’t voluntary members are called “nonresidents”, “transient foreigners”, and exclusively private. See:
Self, Family, Church, Local Self Governance, and Private Membership Associations (PMAs), SEDM
https://sedm.org/self-family-church-and-local-self-governance/
20. Corrupt governments strapped for cash because they are counterfeiting fiat currency and recklessly deficit spending then FORCE/COERCE the adhesion contract and membership upon you to generate revenue by:
20.1. Making domicile a matter of fact or implied consent rather than express choice. See:
Invisible Consent, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/how-you-volunteer/invisible-consent/
Why Domicile and Becoming a “Taxpayer” Require Your Consent, Form #05.020
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Domicile.pdf
20.2. PRESUMING that CIVIL statutory citizens**+D are the same as POLITICAL citizen*. See:
How You are Illegally Deceived or Compelled to Transition from Being a POLITICAL Citizen to a CIVIL Citizen: By Confusing the Two Contexts-Family Guardian Fellowship
https://famguardian.org/Subjects/LawAndGovt/Citizenship/HowCitObfuscated.htm
20.3. Confusing WHICH “United States” you are a “member of”: The government as a public officer or merely a private citizen under the Constitution. See:
Which “United States”?: HOW to discern meaning between GEOGRAPHICAL and CORPORATE based on statutory context, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/united-states-how-to-discern-geographcial-from-corporate-based-on-context/
The result of implementing any one or more of the above three techniques is CRIMINAL IDENTITY THEFT and human trafficking implemented to FORCE you to become a “customer” of things you don’t want and don’t need and STEALING from you to pay for them, ironically, in the name of “protecting you”. That “customer” is called a CIVIL STATUTORY “citizen”, “resident”, or “person”, which collectively are called a “civil status” and which also is an office or position INSIDE the government as a corporation that is “domestic”. See:
Identity Theft Affidavit, Form #14.020
https://sedm.org/Forms/14-PropProtection/Identity_Theft_Affidavit-f14039.pdf
Government Identity Theft, Form #05.046
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/GovernmentIdentityTheft.pdf
21. In response to this article, some people are inclined to respond as follows:
21.1. That since the Sixteenth Amendment begins with “The Congress shall have the power”, that this somehow authorizes Congress to offer or sell services or property in states of the Union and charge for them. We call such services “civil services” on this website. However, NONE of the services the tax described by Internal Revenue Code Subtitles A and C actually pays for are enumerated or listed or expressly authorized by Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. To interpret this as authority to offer or sell ANY service or product or property they want, and especially things not expressly listed in the constitution, and charge for it within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state violates the Ninth and Tenth Amendments and makes the national government into a commercial INVADER and COMPETITOR rather than PROTECTOR of the states in violation of Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution. It also creates a criminal conflict of financial interest in violation of 26 U.S.C. §208: and encourages the national government to place self-interest ABOVE that of protecting private property.
United States Constitution
Article 4, Section 4The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
[SOURCE: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-4/section-4/guarantee-clause-generally]
21.2. They don’t offer services in “StatesG of the Union.” They offer them in the “United StatesG” Federal subject matter (USPI) makes StatesG jurisdiction 100% irrelevant—like it doesn’t even exist. It’s federal preemption through federal supremacy. This is why TPs always lose on the tax issue. They don’t get this!
In THEORY this is correct, but in PRACTICE it violates the separation of powers because by fiat, administrative agencies permit the services to be delivered outside their territorial jurisdiction, REGARDLESS of what the definitions or the separation of powers permits. Take, for instance, Social Security. Here’s the proof:
Why You Aren’t Eligible for Social Security, Form #06.001
https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/SSNotEligible.pdf
Thus, de facto practices by administrative agencies to offer services or property outside their territorial reach results in a DESTRUCTION of the separation of powers and a DE FACTO rather than DE JURE government. See:
Government Conspiracy to Destroy the Separation of Powers, Form #05.023
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/SeparationOfPowers.pdf
De Facto Government Scam, Form #05.042
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/DeFactoGov.pdf
FURTHER CORROBORATING EVIDENCE:
- DEFINITIONS: “privilege, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/definitions-privilege/ - Authorities on “income”, Family Guardian Fellowship
https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/income.htm - How American Nationals Volunteer to Pay Income Tax, Form #08.024
https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/HowYouVolForIncomeTax.pdf - Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030-how franchises and privileges are abused by corrupt governments to STEAL from you
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf - Why the Federal Income Tax is a Privilege Tax Upon Government Property, Form #04.404** (Member Subscriptions)
https://sedm.org/product/why-the-federal-income-tax-is-a-privilege-tax-on-government-property-form-04-404/ - PROOF OF FACTS: That the I.R.C. Subtitle A Income Tax is Based on USPI and implemented with a mandatory DOMICILE resulting from your voluntary election of CIVIL “citizen**+D of the United States”, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/proof-of-facts-that-the-i-r-c-subtitle-a-income-tax-is-based-on-domicile-in-the-case-of-citizens/ - PROOF OF FACTS: There is no legitimate definition of “citizen of the United States” in the Internal Revenue Code so there is no way other than an election to become one, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/proof-of-facts-there-is-no-legitimate-definition-of-citizen-of-the-united-states-in-the-internal-revenue-code-so-there-is-no-way-other-than-an-election-to-become-one/ - PROOF OF FACTS: Constitutional “income” limitations do not apply to DOMESTIC PROPERTY or ENTITIES so tax is on GROSS RECEIPTS instead of PROFIT, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/proof-of-facts-constitutional-income-limitations-dosnt-apply-to-domestic-entities-so-tax-is-on-gross-receipts-instead-of-profit/ - Journey to Sixteenth Amendment, Fed Reserve, FTSIG-how the Sixteenth Amendment is being MISREPRESENTED by the federal courts as the origin of a CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECT TAX, even though I.R.C. Subtitles A and C has NOTHING TO DO with the Sixteenth Amendment
https://ftsig.org/history/journey-to-16a-fed-reserve-nnot/ - Microsoft Copilot: What type of Constitutional tax is a tax on government employees or officers ONLY?, FTSIG-government employees are privileged
https://ftsig.org/microsoft-copilot-what-type-of-constitutional-tax-is-a-tax-on-government-employees-or-officers-only/