INTRODUCTION:

Violations of due process always involve a taking of private propertyPRI, whether that property is rights, tangible or intangible property. This article describes all the ways government STEALS private property.

If you would like tools to challenge illegal enforcement resulting from the violations of due process described here, see:

HOW TO: Challenging IRS Enforcement, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/how-to-challenging-irs-enforcement/

---

QUESTION 1:

Provide a table documenting all the methods of violating constitutional due process in enforcing what is a voluntary income tax because there is no liability statute or because all capacities that have obligations must be elected. Format the table as follows:

1. Column 1: #
2. Column 2: Branch of government
3. Column 3: Technique
4. Column 4: Authorities.
5. Column 5: Explanation

Base the table on FTSIG PUB/PRI.

Include extraconstitutional doctrinal techniques.

Group into separate sections with one section for each branch of government.

Include due process violations caused by presumptions against those in private capacityPRI in violation of constitutional rather than administrative due process, such as:

1. Includes expansion of terms to include private propertyPRI and those in private capacityPRI.
2. Presumption of correctness of IRS assessments.
3. Conversion of legal conclusions into facts using perjury statement on tax forms.
   HOW TO: Distinguishing “Facts” from “Legal Conclusions, FTSIG
   https://ftsig.org/how-to-distinguishing-facts-from-legal-conclusions/
4. Using the perjury statement to validate information on the form that the IRS says you can’t trust and which is therefore not evidence.
   IRS Forms/Pubs/Statements warning, FTSIG
   https://ftsig.org/special-language/irs-pubs-warning/

Include misapplication of the Writ of Certiorari Act to those in private capacityPRI. Congress can’t legislatively deprive private capacityPRI litigants from First Amendment petitions to the Supreme Court.

Make the first section about property jurisdiction. Describe violation of due process resulting from the inability of congress to civilly regulate or tax property that it doesn’t have an ownership interest in. That’s stealing:

Effect of Definitions Upon OWNERSHIP and CONTROL of Property, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/how-you-volunteer/effect-of-definitions-upon-ownership-of-property/

Exclude the Public Interest Doctrine from the property jurisdiction section, which clearly does permit regulation of harmful activities.

ANSWER 1:

Because your request is framed in terms of the FTSIG PUB/PRI model rather than mainstream constitutional doctrine, the table below should be understood as a description of alleged due-process defects under the FTSIG framework, not as a statement of judicial findings that are often at odds with the constitution in a process known as extraconstitutional doctrinal inversion.

REFERENCE: Extraconstitutional Civil Statutory Proprietary Enforcement and Doctrinal Inversion Against personPRI, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/reference-extraconstitutional-civil-statutory-proprietary-enforcement-and-doctrinal-inversion-against-personpri/

I. PROPERTY JURISDICTION AND OWNERSHIP DOCTRINES

Excluding the public-interest / police-power doctrine is sensible because that doctrine concerns regulation of harmful, injurious, or public-welfare-related conduct and does not necessarily depend on ownership. Under the FTSIG model, the focus is narrower:

The issue is not whether government may regulate harmful conduct.

The issue is whether government may assert incidents of ownership, control, taxation, beneficial interest, trustee powers, or franchise jurisdiction over property that remains exclusively private (PRI) property and in which government has no demonstrated property interest.

The premise of this section is that:

1. If no harmful activities are involved, Sovereign Power and the Public Interest Doctrine does not INVOLUNTARILY apply.
2. Absent sovereign power, only Proprietary Power is involved.
3. Proprietary power requires consent to convert PRIVATE propertyPRI to PUBLIC propertyPUB before it may be taxed or regulated. This requirement for consent to convert PRIVATE to PUBLIC is further documented in:
   Separation Between Public and Private Course, Form #12.025
   http://sedm.org/LibertyU/SeparatingPublicPrivate.pdf

#	Branch	Technique	Authorities Commonly Implicated	FTSIG Characterization
PJ-1	Legislative	Taxation of private property without consent	Internal Revenue Code generally	Congress treats PRIVATE propertyPRI as though it were PUBLIC propertyPUB without proving consent to conversion.
PJ-2	Legislative	Regulation of private property without consent	Federal regulatory statutes generally	Regulatory authority is asserted without proof of voluntary conversion into property subject to public administration.
PJ-3	Legislative	Definition-based conversion of property	26 U.S.C. §7701 and related definitions	Definitions are alleged to change jurisdictional character without changing ownership.
PJ-4	Legislative	Expansion of statutory terms into private property	Statutory construction doctrines	Definitions applicable to public property are allegedly extended into private property.
PJ-5	Legislative	Conversion by classification	Administrative classifications created by statute	Property allegedly becomes PUBLIC merely because government labels it as such.
PJ-6	Executive	Administrative conversion of property status	IRS administrative records	Bureaucratic records allegedly transform PRIVATE propertyPRI into PUBLIC propertyPUB.
PJ-7	Executive	Administrative assertion of ownership powers	26 U.S.C. §§6321, 6331	Incidents of ownership are exercised without proving authority arising from consent.
PJ-8	Executive	Administrative control through filing systems	Forms 1040, W-4, W-9 and related forms	Filing systems allegedly induce owners to characterize private property as public property.
PJ-9	Executive	Administrative control through record systems	Assessment and master-file systems	Databases allegedly become the source of federal control over otherwise private property.
PJ-10	Executive	Property conversion through admissions	26 U.S.C. §6065	Jurat language allegedly creates admissions supporting public-property classifications.
PJ-11	Executive	Property conversion through information returns	W-2 and 1099 reporting systems	Third-party reports allegedly support public-property treatment without proving consent.
PJ-12	Judicial	Presumption that classified property is public property	Tax enforcement jurisprudence generally	Courts allegedly presume validity of the classification rather than requiring proof of consent.
PJ-13	Judicial	Failure to require proof of conversion	Collection and assessment litigation	Courts allegedly do not require proof that PRIVATE propertyPRI was lawfully converted into PUBLIC propertyPUB.
PJ-14	Judicial	Presumption of correctness applied to ownership questions	Welch v. Helvering; United States v. Janis	Presumptions allegedly replace proof of lawful conversion.
PJ-15	Judicial	Burden shifting regarding property status	Tax Court Rule 142(a)	Owner allegedly bears burden to disprove public-property status.
PJ-16	Judicial	Administrative records accepted as proof	Certificates of assessment and related records	Government records allegedly become proof of the facts necessary to justify government control.
PJ-17	Judicial	Expansion of statutory definitions into private property	Definition cases generally	Statutory terminology allegedly enlarges governmental reach into private ownership.
PJ-18	Legislative / Executive	Franchise-property substitution	Filing and reporting systems	Property is allegedly treated as franchise-connected property without proving a franchise relationship.
PJ-19	Executive / Judicial	Possession treated as evidence of public status	Reporting and enforcement regimes	Possession allegedly becomes evidence that property belongs in a public regulatory domain.
PJ-20	All Branches	De facto taking by classification	Fifth Amendment Due Process and Takings Clauses	Government classification allegedly substitutes for lawful acquisition of authority.
PJ-21	All Branches	PUB-to-PRI inversion of ownership	Fifth Amendment	Property is presumed public enough to regulate unless owner proves otherwise.
PJ-22	All Branches	Government-created property jurisdiction	Enforcement framework generally	Jurisdiction allegedly originates from governmental assertions instead of owner consent.
PJ-23	All Branches	Failure to prove voluntary conversion	Entire administrative process	Government allegedly assumes conversion rather than proving it.
PJ-24	All Branches	Regulation without sovereign necessity and without consent	General regulatory and tax regimes	Government allegedly proceeds despite the absence of either harmful conduct or voluntary conversion into PUBLIC status.

Under a strict FTSIG analysis, this category is distinct from police-power regulation because it concerns ownership, control, beneficial interest, jurisdiction, and taxation of property, not regulation of harmful conduct. In that framework, the core question becomes:

What constitutionally cognizable federal interest in the property has been proven before ownership-type incidents of control, taxation, lien, levy, or administration are exercised?

That is a different inquiry from whether government may prohibit or regulate conduct that threatens public health, safety, or welfare.

Under the FTSIG framework, many of the other items in sections after this are actually downstream consequences of this larger constitutional requirement:

1. Presumption of correctness.
2. Information-return presumptions.
3. Jurat admissions.
4. Constructive consent.
5. Constructive election.
6. Identity-capacity conflation.
7. Capacity by participation.
8. Expansion of statutory definitions.
9. Record-generated jurisdiction.

In a strict FTSIG analysis, all of those would be viewed as mechanisms for accomplishing what the theory regards as the primary constitutional defect:

Assertion of governmental control over allegedly private property (PRI property) without first proving a constitutionally sufficient federal interest in that property.

A failure to LEAVE YOU or your private propertyPRI alone is a violation of the principles of “justice” itself, which is defined as “the right to be left alone” as long as you aren’t hurting anyone:

What is “Justice”?, Form #05.050
http://sedm.org/whatisjustice

---

II. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH (Congress)

#	Technique	Authorities	FTSIG Characterization
L-1	Descriptor-to-office conversion	26 U.S.C. §7701(a)	Definitions allegedly substitute for proof of an actual public office or franchise.
L-2	Omission of election requirement	Fifth Amendment; IRC generally	Statutes allegedly impose obligations without requiring proof of election into the status creating them.
L-3	Definition-based jurisdiction	26 U.S.C. §7701	Definitions allegedly become jurisdictional facts.
L-4	Capacity ambiguity	Internal Revenue Code generally	Statutes allegedly blur PUB and PRI capacities.
L-5	Delegation of status determination	26 U.S.C. §7805	Treasury allegedly given authority to define jurisdictional status.
L-6	Statutory incorporation of presumptions	Assessment and reporting statutes	Presumptions purportedly replace proof.
L-7	Expansion of terms into private domain	26 U.S.C. §7701; statutory construction doctrines	Public-law terminology allegedly expanded to reach private persons and property.
L-8	Legal-person substitution	26 U.S.C. §7701(a)	Natural persons and statutory persons allegedly conflated.
L-9	Conflation of person and office	26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(1)	Offices, franchises, and natural persons allegedly treated interchangeably.
L-10	Constructive election by operation of statute	Filing, reporting, withholding statutes	Conduct allegedly deemed an election into status without explicit consent.
L-11	Capacity by participation	Subtitle A structure generally	Economic participation allegedly treated as sufficient status.
L-12	Benefit-burden coupling	Social Security Act and benefit programs	Acceptance of benefits allegedly treated as acceptance of unrelated obligations.
L-13	Licensing inference	Federal licensing statutes	Licenses allegedly treated as proof of broader public obligations.

---

III. EXECUTIVE BRANCH (IRS, Treasury, Administrative Agencies)

#	Technique	Authorities	FTSIG Characterization
E-1	Presumption of public capacity	26 U.S.C. §6201	Government allegedly starts from a presumption of public status.
E-2	Presumption of liability	26 U.S.C. §§6201, 6211	Liability allegedly presumed before jurisdiction is proven.
E-3	Assessment without capacity adjudication	26 U.S.C. §§6201-6213	Assessments allegedly occur before capacity is established.
E-4	Administrative status creation	IRS procedures; Treasury regulations	Records supposedly create status rather than document it.
E-5	Information-return substitution	26 U.S.C. §§6041, 6051	Information returns allegedly substitute for proof.
E-6	Information returns as prima facie evidence of status	Forms W-2 and 1099	Third-party reports allegedly become evidence of legal status.
E-7	Collection-first doctrine	26 U.S.C. §§6321, 6331	Property is allegedly reached before final adjudication.
E-8	Self-assessment doctrine	26 U.S.C. §6151	Individual induced to admit liability.
E-9	Withholding as status presumption	26 U.S.C. §3402	Withholding allegedly presumes status.
E-10	Administrative estoppel	IRS enforcement practice	Prior conduct allegedly treated as proof of continuing status.
E-11	Record-generated jurisdiction	IRS Master File; §6203	Records become evidence of jurisdiction.
E-12	Enforcement-by-form	Forms 1040, W-4, W-9	Forms allegedly create facts needed for enforcement.
E-13	Identity-capacity conflation	SSN/TIN system	Administrative identifiers treated as evidence of status.
E-14	Identifier equals status	SSN/TIN reporting regime	Possession of identifier allegedly becomes proof of status.
E-15	Filing behavior equals status acceptance	§§6011, 6012, 6151	Filing treated as acceptance of status.
E-16	Conversion of legal conclusions into evidentiary facts through jurat	26 U.S.C. §6065	Jurat allegedly converts legal conclusions into admissions.
E-17	Reliance upon admissions from forms deemed unreliable	§§6065, 6201	IRS allegedly both distrusts and relies upon return information.
E-18	Administrative convenience doctrine	Tax administration doctrine	Convenience allegedly replaces constitutional proof.
E-19	Voluntary-compliance narrative	IRS publications	Voluntary compliance terminology allegedly obscures actual jurisdictional basis.

---

IV. JUDICIAL BRANCH (Courts)

#	Technique	Authorities	FTSIG Characterization
J-1	Judicial notice of status	Fed. R. Evid. 201	Courts allegedly accept status assumptions without requiring proof of PUB capacity.
J-2	Presumption of correctness of assessments	Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)	IRS assessments are presumed correct, allegedly shifting the burden from government to the individual.
J-3	Presumption of correctness as substitute for constitutional proof	Welch; Janis	Evidentiary presumptions allegedly replace proof of jurisdictional facts and status.
J-4	Burden shifting	Tax Court Rule 142(a)	Taxpayer allegedly forced to disprove liability rather than government proving it.
J-5	Circular statutory interpretation	General tax jurisprudence	Obligation is inferred from status while status is inferred from obligation.
J-6	Exclusion of capacity challenges	Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984); 26 U.S.C. §6673	PUB/PRI arguments routinely characterized as frivolous rather than adjudicated on the merits.
J-7	Standing restrictions	Article III standing doctrine	Limits pre-enforcement constitutional challenges.
J-8	Anti-Injunction barriers	26 U.S.C. §7421(a)	Preventive judicial review is restricted until after enforcement occurs.
J-9	Waiver by silence	Federal waiver doctrines	Failure to object is treated as consent or acceptance.
J-10	Silence as admission of status	Procedural default doctrines	Non-response is treated as evidence supporting government presumptions.
J-11	Substance-over-capacity reasoning	Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)	Conduct allegedly becomes more important than actual capacity.
J-12	Agency deference	Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Mayo Foundation v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011)	Courts defer to executive interpretations of status and jurisdiction.
J-13	Pay-first-litigate-later	Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960)	Property allegedly must be surrendered before meaningful review is available.
J-14	Administrative exhaustion	26 U.S.C. §§7422, 7433	Constitutional questions allegedly cannot be heard until administrative remedies are exhausted.
J-15	Res judicata	Federal common law	Earlier judgments prevent later challenges to status or jurisdiction.
J-16	Collateral estoppel	Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979)	Prior factual findings bind future proceedings.
J-17	Harmless-error doctrine	Fed. R. Civ. P. 61	Constitutional defects allegedly overlooked if characterized as non-prejudicial.
J-18	Sovereign immunity	Sovereign-immunity jurisprudence	Government insulated from certain constitutional challenges.
J-19	Official immunity	Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)	Officials protected from personal liability for constitutional violations.
J-20	Qualified immunity	Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)	Officials shielded unless rights are “clearly established.”
J-21	Conversion of statutory presumptions into adjudicative facts	Assessment and deficiency jurisprudence	Administrative assumptions become judicial findings without independent proof.
J-22	Judicial acceptance of information-return presumptions	W-2 and 1099 litigation generally	Third-party reports allegedly accepted as evidence of status rather than merely evidence of transactions.
J-23	Judicial acceptance of jurat-based admissions	26 U.S.C. §6065	Signed returns allegedly treated as admissions of jurisdictional conclusions.
J-24	Treating legal conclusions as evidentiary admissions	§6065; return-jurat jurisprudence	Legal characterizations on forms become evidentiary facts.
J-25	Treating filing as proof of status	§§6011, 6012, 6151	Filing activity allegedly becomes proof that the filer belongs to the regulated class.
J-26	Treating prior filings as continuing estoppel	Prior-return jurisprudence	Historic compliance allegedly used as evidence of present status.
J-27	Identity-capacity conflation	SSN/TIN enforcement cases	Administrative identification is allegedly treated as proof of legal capacity.
J-28	Acceptance of administrative records as proof of jurisdiction	IRS Master File; Certificates of Assessment	Government-created records allegedly become evidence of the facts they presume.
J-29	Expansion of statutory terms to private persons	Tax-definition cases; §7701	Terms allegedly applicable to PUB capacities extended to PRI persons.
J-30	Expansion of statutory terms to private property	Tax-definition and property cases	Public-law terminology allegedly extended to PRI property interests.
J-31	Reclassification of PRI conduct as PUB conduct	Regulatory-interpretation cases	Private acts allegedly recharacterized as public acts.
J-32	Constructive consent	Waiver and implied-consent doctrines	Consent inferred from conduct rather than expressly proven.
J-33	Constructive election	Filing, registration, withholding systems	Participation allegedly treated as election into a public status.
J-34	Presumption that economic participation creates status	Taxable-income jurisprudence generally	Income-producing activity allegedly treated as evidence of public capacity.
J-35	First Amendment Petition Clause circumvention	U.S. Const. amend. I	Petition rights allegedly subordinated to discretionary review procedures.
J-36	Conversion of right to petition into request for permission	Supreme Court Rule 10	Constitutional petition allegedly transformed into discretionary certiorari request.
J-37	Denial of constitutional review through discretionary docket control	Supreme Court Rule 10	Meritorious constitutional claims may allegedly be denied review without reaching merits.
J-38	Misapplication of discretionary-certiorari doctrine to PRI litigants	Judiciary Act of 1925; 28 U.S.C. §§1254, 1257	FTSIG argues private-capacity petitioners are improperly treated as seeking discretionary privileges rather than exercising constitutional petition rights.
J-39	Statutory restriction of appellate review	28 U.S.C. §§1254, 1257	Congressional control of appellate jurisdiction allegedly applied to constitutional petition rights.
J-40	Conversion of constitutional questions into procedural questions	Standing, mootness, ripeness doctrines	Courts resolve cases on procedural grounds without reaching constitutional merits.
J-41	Mootness barriers	Article III mootness doctrine	Claims may become unreviewable after enforcement concludes.
J-42	Ripeness barriers	Article III ripeness doctrine	Constitutional issues delayed until enforcement has already occurred.
J-43	Jurisdiction-by-presumption	Jurisdictional rulings generally	Jurisdiction allegedly assumed from administrative classifications rather than proven.
J-44	PUB-to-PRI inversion	Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause	Courts allegedly presume public status and place the burden on the individual to prove otherwise.

Under the FTSIG framework, the judicial branch concerns tend to cluster into six themes:

1. Presumption doctrines (J-2 through J-4, J-21 through J-24).
2. Procedural-barrier doctrines (J-7 through J-17, J-40 through J-42).
3. Status-substitution doctrines (J-25 through J-34, J-43).
4. Petition-Clause doctrines (J-35 through J-39).
5. Immunity doctrines (J-18 through J-20).
6. PUB/PRI inversion doctrines (J-44 and related entries).

This version is substantially more complete than the earlier judicial section because it includes the Petition Clause / certiorari categories, jurat-admission categories, information-return presumptions, private-property expansion theories, and status-substitution doctrines you identified.

---

V. HYBRID LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE DOCTRINES

#	Technique	Authorities	FTSIG Characterization
H-1	Constructive election theory	Filing and reporting statutes	Conduct treated as election into public status.
H-2	Constructive consent doctrine	Waiver and implied-consent doctrines	Consent allegedly inferred rather than proven.
H-3	Reclassification of private acts as public acts	Regulatory interpretation doctrines	Private conduct recharacterized as public activity.
H-4	PUB-to-PRI inversion	Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause	Government allegedly presumes public status and requires rebuttal.
H-5	Expansion of public-law terminology into private property	Statutory definitions and interpretive doctrines	Public-law terms allegedly applied to private property without proving public status.
H-6	Conversion of administrative presumptions into constitutional facts	Assessment and enforcement framework	Administrative assumptions allegedly become judicially accepted facts.
H-7	Legal conclusion transformed into evidentiary admission	§6065 jurat and assessment process	Filing allegedly creates evidence supporting the government’s legal theory.
H-8	Self-created evidence doctrine	Forms, assessments, information returns	Government-generated records allegedly become evidence of jurisdiction.
H-9	Presumed status from identifiers	SSN/TIN systems and reporting statutes	Identification systems allegedly become jurisdictional substitutes.
H-10	Presumed status from participation	Employment, filing, reporting, receipt of benefits	Activity itself allegedly becomes proof of status.

Notes on “extraconstitutional doctrinal techniques” often discussed in the FTSIG context

These are not usually tied to a single statute but are often described by proponents as extra-constitutional mechanisms:

Technique	Common Authorities
Constructive consent	Estoppel doctrines; implied consent cases
Constructive election	Filing, registration, withholding, reporting systems
Presumption of correctness	Welch v. Helvering; United States v. Janis
Substance-over-form	Gregory v. Helvering
Agency deference	Chevron and related doctrines
Administrative exhaustion	26 U.S.C. §§7421, 7422 and related jurisprudence
Pay-first litigate-later	Flora v. United States
Procedural default and waiver	Federal Rules and common-law waiver doctrines
Res judicata and collateral estoppel	Federal preclusion doctrines
Frivolous-position sanctions	26 U.S.C. §6673

Under the FTSIG PUB/PRI model, these doctrines are commonly characterized as mechanisms that permit enforcement without what the theory regards as the constitutionally necessary first step: proving an affirmative, voluntary, and legally sufficient election into the public capacity from which the obligation allegedly arises. Mainstream courts, however, generally do not accept that PUB/PRI premise and instead treat liability as arising directly from the Internal Revenue Code and applicable constitutional authority.

Summary

Under a strict FTSIG PUB/PRI analysis, the alleged defects fall into four broad categories:

1. Status-Proving Substitutes: definitions, forms, identifiers, records, information returns, and presumptions used instead of proving a voluntary PUB election.
2. Burden-Shifting Devices: presumptions of correctness, waiver doctrines, standing restrictions, and exhaustion requirements.
3. Admission-Creation Mechanisms: jurats, self-assessment, filings, withholding, and reporting systems.
4. Jurisdiction-Preserving Doctrines: sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, anti-injunction rules, preclusion doctrines, and judicial deference.

Those four categories collectively encompass virtually all of the due-process objections that the FTSIG PUB/PRI model raises regarding modern federal tax administration.