PROOF OF FACTS: You’re Not the “Employee” mentioned in 26 U.S.C. 3401(c)

FALSE STATEMENT:

We as a company have to to do “wage” withholding and reporting on you because we are an “employer” and you are an “employee” per the Internal Revenue Code.

REBUTTAL:

As a general rule, it is difficult and sometimes impossible to prove a negative, which in this case is that I am NOT an “employee” who earns “wages” as defined in I.R.C. Subtitle C.

“It is difficult and unfair to require a party to prove a negative fact. See United States v. Corte-Rivera, 454 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2006). ”

[Bank of Am. v. WestTrop Ass’n, No. 2:16-cv-1451-KJD-DJA, at *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2020) ]

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“[A] witness may clearly testify as to his failure to find the records after a search. This, in fact, is frequently the only way in which a negative fact can be proved.” McClanahan v. United States, 292 F.2d 630, 637 (5th Cir. 1961). ”

[Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1969)]

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“When a party is attempting to prove a negative slight evidence is sufficient.”

[People v. MacBeth, 104 Cal.App. 690, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930)]

It ought be sufficient in this case to simply say that slavery is illegal, and that if I don’t want the “benefit” of a civil status to which obligations or loss of ownership or control over my private property attach, then it ought to be enough to simply say I don’t consent to BE an “employee” or to earn “wages” and be done with it. Any other approach only condones identity theft and theft in violation of the constitution, in fact. If you don’t care enough about your own workers to accept the responsibility to respect their equal right to the absolute control over their own bodies and property that you have by respecting these ideas, why did you hire them to begin with? Are you only looking for animals and pets and beasts of burden with no rights at all to do your bidding?

However, what I CAN prove is that neither I nor my earnings satisfy the legal definitions of the terms, that neither I nor you I can ADD to those definitions without committing a crime and violating due process of law, and that you are engaging in criminal identity theft to PRESUME that I or my earnings satisfy those definitions with no proof that they do.

1. The definition of “employee” in 26 U.S.C. §3401(c) is as follows:

26 U.S. Code § 3401 – Definitions

(c)Employee

For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.

The use of the word “includes” in the definition of “employee” does NOT permit you as a hiring company to unilaterally add PRIVATE people such as myself to the definition of “employee”. That would be a violation of the rules of statutory construction and of the separation of powers between PRIVATE and PUBLIC, as explained in:

Includes and Including, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/special-language/includes-including/

2. The definition of “wages” in 26 U.S.C. §3402(a) is as follows:

26 U.S. Code § 3402 – Income tax collected at source

(a)Wages

For purposes of this chapter, the term “wages” means all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term shall not include remuneration paid—

3. The definition of “employer” in 26 U.S.C. §3401(d)

26 U.S. Code § 3401 – Definitions

(d)Employer

For purposes of this chapter, the term “employer” means the person for whom an individual performs or performed any service, of whatever nature, as the employee of such person, except that—

(1) if the person for whom the individual performs or performed the services does not have control of the payment of the wages for such services, the term “employer” (except for purposes of subsection (a)) means the person having control of the payment of such wages, and

(2) in the case of a person paying wages on behalf of a nonresident alien individual, foreign partnership, or foreign corporation, not engaged in trade or business within the United States, the term “employer” (except for purposes of subsection (a)) means such person.

4. Earning “wages” requires BOTH an “employer” and “employee” at both ends of the transaction

So an “employer” in 26 U.S.C. §3401(d) is someone who has “employees” under 26 U.S.C. §3401(c).

1. I’m not within the legal definition of “employee” defined in 26 U.S.C. §3401(c).
2. The use of the word “includes” in the definition of “employee” doesn’t allow you to add anyone not expressly listed in the definition. That would be identity theft and a violation of due process of law.
3. I don’t consent to be treated AS IF I’m the “employee” defined in 26 U.S.C. §3401(c).
4. If I even TRY to demonstrate consent to be treated AS IF I am THE “employee” defined in 26 U.S.C. §3401(c), then I would be committing the crime of impersonating a federal “employee” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §912.
5. I also don’t consent to call my earnings from labor “wages” or a “federal payment” by submitting a W-4 under 26 U.S.C. §3402(p).
6. My earnings are not even within the definition of “federal payment” in 26 U.S.C. §3402(p)(1)(C) such that I COULD lawfully elect to treat my earnings as a “federal payment”.
7. I challenge whether ANY of your workers could even lawfully be declared “employee” as described here and if they can’t, you can’t lawfully call yourself an “employer” under 26 U.S.C. §3401(d).

All I want to do is exchange my labor for money and in that sense am merely RENTING private property to you for a fee not connected with any sort of government benefit or supervision and therefore acting in an exclusively private capacity not subject to civil statutory jurisdiction. If I can’t act in a private capacity and am compelled to act as an “employee” by you as a precondition of either getting or keeping a position in your company, then all I can describe this interaction as is an act of slavery, human trafficking, and extortion.

5. Questions

QUESTION 1: Would you agree that the “employee” defined in 26 U.S.C. §3401(c) works for the United States government as a public officer but not necessarily a public official under 5 U.S.C. §2105 and thus is subject to the jurisdiction of Congress?

QUESTION 2: Would you agree that those who claim the above status but do NOT lawfully occupy such an office are committing the crime of impersonating a public officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §912?

QUESTION 3: Would you agree that withholding on the earnings of someone who does not satisfy the definition of “employee” above, does not consent to the status, and sending the withholdings to the national government would constitute sending a criminal bribe to the national government to treat your workers as public officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. §210?

QUESTION 4: Would you agree that Congress cannot, through the abuse of the words “includes and including” expand upon the definition of “employee” to facilitate any of the above crimes since Congress cannot authorize crimes by legislation?

6. A Better Way Forward

To work around these major violations of law and preserve our relationship, I propose the following solutions:

1. I warranty and guarantee to you that any alleged liability that you might think you have to withhold or report in my case I hereby accept the full and completely responsibility for and indemnify you.
2. I propose as a replacement to your standard “employee” contract a simple property rental agreement in which you rent my body to perform not “services” in connection with “compensation for services”, but merely an hourly property rental of a human body that I absolutely and exclusively own.
3. Property rental agreements are not addressed anywhere in the the Internal Revenue code as taxable, because they involve not profit to either one of us. “Income” is constitutionally defined as “profit” by the Sixteenth Amendment, and this has NEVER changed. 26 U.S.C. §83 recognizes that exchanges of labor for money as an equal exchange of property are not taxable where no profit is involved. See:
   Proof that Involuntary Income Tax on Your Labor are Slavery, Form #05.055
   https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ProofIncomeTaxLaborSlavery.pdf
4. Congress has NO constitutional authority to impair any PRIVATE contract such as the one that I propose for the rental of property. It is unconstitutional to do so:
   
   “Independent of these views, there are many considerations which lead to the conclusion that the power to impair contracts, by direct action to that end, does not exist with the general government. In the first place, one of the objects of the Constitution, expressed in its preamble, was the establishment of justice, and what that meant in its relations to contracts is not left, as was justly said by the late Chief Justice, in Hepburn v. Griswold, to inference or conjecture. As he observes, at the time the Constitution was undergoing discussion in the convention, the Congress of the Confederation was engaged in framing the ordinance for the government of the Northwestern Territory, in which certain articles of compact were established between the people of the original States and the people of the Territory, for the purpose, as expressed in the instrument, of extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, upon which the States, their laws and constitutions, were erected. By that ordinance it was declared, that, in the just preservation of rights and property, ‘no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said Territory, that shall, in any manner, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements bona fide and without fraud previously formed.’ The same provision, adds the Chief Justice, found more condensed expression in the prohibition upon the States against impairing the obligation of contracts, which has ever been recognized as an efficient safeguard against injustice; and though the prohibition is not applied in terms to the government of the United States, he expressed the opinion, speaking for himself and the majority of the court at the time, that it was clear ‘that those who framed and those who adopted the Constitution intended that the spirit of this prohibition should pervade the entire body of legislation, and that the justice which the Constitution was ordained to establish was not thought by them to be compatible with legislation of an opposite tendency.’ 8 Wall. 623. [99 U.S. 700, 765] 
   
   Similar views are found expressed in the opinions of other judges of this court. In Calder v. Bull, which was here in 1798, Mr. Justice Chase said, that there were acts which the Federal and State legislatures could not do without exceeding their authority, and among them he mentioned a law which punished a citizen for an innocent act; a law that destroyed or impaired the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that made a man judge in his own case; and a law that took the property from A. and gave it to B. ‘It is against all reason and justice,’ he added, ‘for a people to intrust a legislature with such powers, and therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done it. They may command what is right and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime, or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract, or the right of private property. To maintain that a Federal or State legislature possesses such powers if they had not been expressly restrained, would, in my opinion, be a political heresy altogether inadmissible in all free republican governments.’ 3 Dall. 388.
   
   In Ogden v. Saunders, which was before this court in 1827, Mr. Justice Thompson, referring to the clauses of the Constitution prohibiting the State from passing a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law, or a law impairing the obligation of contracts, said: ‘Neither provision can strictly be considered as introducing any new principle, but only for greater security and safety to incorporate into this charter provisions admitted by all to be among the first principles of our government. No State court would, I presume, sanction and enforce an ex post facto law, if no such prohibition was contained in the Constitution of the United States; so, neither would retrospective laws, taking away vested rights, be enforced. Such laws are repugnant to those fundamental principles upon which every just system of laws is founded.’
   
   In the Federalist, Mr. Madison declared that laws impairing the obligation of contracts were contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation; and in the Dartmouth College Case Mr. Webster contended that acts, which were there held to impair the obligation of contracts, were not the exercise of a power properly legislative, [99 U.S. 700, 766]   as their object and effect was to take away vested rights. ‘To justify the taking away of vested rights,’ he said, ‘there must be a forfeiture, to adjudge upon and declare which is the proper province of the judiciary.’ Surely the Constitution would have failed to establish justice had it allowed the exercise of such a dangerous power to the Congress of the United States.
   
   In the second place, legislation impairing the obligation of contracts impinges upon the provision of the Constitution which declares that no one shall be deprived of his property without due process of law; and that means by law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice. Contracts are property, and a large portion of the wealth of the country exists in that form. Whatever impairs their value diminishes, therefore, the property of the owner; and if that be effected by direct legislative action operating upon the contract, forbidding its enforcement or transfer, or otherwise restricting its use, the owner is as much deprived of his property without due process of law as if the contract were impounded, or the value it represents were in terms wholly or partially confiscated.
   [Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 764-766 (1878);
   SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17733919134422752358]
   

6. Proposed Property Rental Agreement

Whereas the parties to this agreement are operating in their private, unregulated capacity under rules of equity, the Bill of Rights, and common law and not the CIVIL law.

And whereas the parties would like to exchange for valuable mutual consideration of equal value that involves no profit, which is what “income” is defined as in the Sixteenth Amendment.

And whereas it is beyond the legislative power of any government to either IMPAIR any contract or to insert itself INTO every contract by making either party to the contract its agent or officer.

Now therefore:

1. Party A agrees to rent his/her body as private property for whatever use is prescribed by Party B.
2. In return, Party B agrees to pay $____ for each hour the body is used as an equal exchange of fair market value.
3. Party B agrees to indemnify Party B for any penalties that might occur by virtue of honoring this agreement.
4. The parties to this agreement agree that in the event of any disputes under this contract, the laws of equity and common law shall be the sole choice of law as described in:
   Choice of Law, Litigation Tool #10.010
   https://sedm.org/Litigation/01-General/ChoiceOfLaw.pdf

Signed:

Signature:__________________________________________, Party A

Date: _______________________

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Signature:__________________________________________, Party B

Date: _______________________

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