Anti-Weaponization Attachment

By ftsig-admin | December 20, 2024

EDITORIAL:

Throughout this website, we repeatedly state that THE two major problems we are combatting are:

  1. Accepting government privileges and the loss of rights this entails…AND
  2. The “weaponization of government” associated with the acceptance of such privileges that produce a near COMPLETE destruction of all private property and private rights of the parties who undertake the acceptance. We call this “weaponization of government” as defined in the link below:
    Definitions: Weaponization of Government, FTSIG
    https://ftsig.org/weaponization-of-government/

An example of the problems introduced by item #2 above is described in the following AI Discovery:

AI DISCOVERY: Abuse of State Driver Licensing Monopoly to effect Unconstitutional Conditions that Destroy Rights, SEDM
https://sedm.org/ai-discovery-abuse-of-state-driver-licensing-monopoly-to-effect-unconstitutional-conditions-that-destroy-rights/

The purpose of this attachment for use in a withholding form or any government form is to completely invalidate any attempt to “bundle” anything along with the acceptance of a specific privilege and thus to DESTROY and even PUNISH all attempts at “weaponization of government”.

Additional background information on this subject can be found at:

  1. Catalog of U.S. Supreme Court Doctrines, Litigation Tool #10.020, Section 5.2: Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, SEDM
    https://sedm.org/Litigation/10-PracticeGuides/SCDoctrines.pdf
  2. Reference->Member Subscriber DVDs->TaxDVD** menu, SEDM (OFFSITE LINK)
    Look in the \Franchises\UnconstCondit directory
    https://sedm.org/reference/dvds/tax-dvd/
  3. Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030, Section 28.3: Unconstitutional Conditions
    https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf

BEGIN ATTACHMENT

1. Whereas the purpose of establishing government, according to the Declaration of Independence, is to protect exclusively private rights and private property of men and women.

2. And whereas the organic law and the common law are the main method of protecting private property and private rights.

3. And whereas it is a violation of fiduciary duty for a public officer or agent to place protection of PUBLIC rights AHEAD OF or ABOVE that of PRIVATE right.

“As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. [1]  Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts. [2]   That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves. [3]  and owes a fiduciary duty to the public. [4]   It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual. [5]   Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official which tends to weaken public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual rights is against public policy.[6]”

[63C Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees, §247]

__________________

FOOTNOTES:

[1] State ex rel. Nagle v Sullivan, 98 Mont 425, 40 P.2d. 995, 99 A.L.R. 321; Jersey City v Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d. 8.

[2] Georgia Dep’t of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d. 524. A public official is held in public trust.  Madlener v. Finley (1st Dist) 161 Ill.App.3d. 796, 113 Ill Dec 712, 515 N.E.2d. 697, app gr 117 Ill Dec 226, 520 N.E.2d. 387 and revd on other grounds 128 Ill.2d. 147, 131 Ill.Dec. 145, 538 N.E.2d. 520.

[3]Chicago Park Dist. V. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d. 555, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d. 181, appeal after remand (1st Dist) 107 Ill.App.3d. 222, 63 Ill.Dec.134, 437 N.E.2d. 783.

[4] United States v. Holzer (CA7 Ill) 816 F.2d. 304 and vacated, remanded on other grounds 484 U.S. 807, 98 L.Ed.2d. 18, 108 S.Ct. 53, on remand (CA7 Ill) 840 F.2d. 1343, cert den 486 U.S. 1035, 100 L.Ed.2d. 608, 108 S.Ct. 2022 and (criticized on other grounds by United States v. Osser (CA3 Pa) 864 F.2d. 1056) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v Little (CA5 Miss) 889 F.2d. 1367) and (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in United States v. Boylan (CA1 Mass) 898 F.2d. 230, 29 Fed.Rules.Evid.Serv. 1223).

[5] Chicago ex rel. Cohen v Keane, 64 Ill.2d. 559, 2 Ill.Dec. 285, 357 N.E.2d. 452, later proceeding (1st Dist) 105 Ill.App.3d. 298, 61 Ill.Dec. 172, 434 N.E.2d. 325.

[6]Indiana State Ethics Comm’n v. Nelson (Ind App) 656 N.E.2d. 1172, reh gr (Ind App) 659 N.E.2d. 260, reh den (Jan 24, 1996) and transfer den (May 28, 1996).

[63C Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees, §247]

4. And whereas the protection of PRIVATE property and PRIVATE rights BEGINS with the government not taxing, regulating, taking, or controlling in any way the property unless it is used to injure someone, in which case the interference must occur AFTER the injurious use of the property is proven with evidence signed under penalty of perjury. In other words, the government has the obligation to LEAVE THE PROPERTY AND ITS OWNER ALONE, which is the very DEFINITION of justice itself.

“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley; “The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone.” Cooley on Torts, 29.”

[Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)]

No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley; “The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone.” Cooley on Torts, 29.

For instance, not only wearing apparel, but a watch or a jewel, worn on the person, is, for the time being, privileged from being taken under distress for rent, or attachment on mesne process, or execution for debt, or writ of replevin. 3 Bl. Com. 8; Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 M. & W. 248, 253*, 254*; 252*252 Mack v. Parks, 8 Gray, 517; Maxham v. Day, 16 Gray, 213.

The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault and a trespass; and no order or process, commanding such an exposure or submission, was ever known to the common law in the administration of justice between individuals, except in a very small number of cases, based upon special reasons, and upon ancient practice, coming down from ruder ages, now mostly obsolete in England, and never, so far as we are aware, introduced into this country. 
[Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)]

5. And whereas leaving property alone is synonymous with maintaining its status as EXCLUSIVELY private and absolutely owned by its owner and SEPARATED entirely from the public and civil statutory realm that might interfere with the enjoyment of its use as documented in:

Separation Between Public and Private Course, Form #12.025
https://sedm.org/LibertyU/SeparatingPublicPrivate.pdf

6. And whereas absolute ownership of private property is diminished by every attempt by the owner to pursue any civil statutory privilege or public right.

“Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,-‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and to ‘secure,’ not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property [or income] which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations:

[1] First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor’s injury, and   that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor’s benefit [e.g. SOCIAL SECURITY, Medicare, and every other public “benefit”];

[2] second, that if he devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and

[3] third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.”

[Budd v. People of State of New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17245612752943291505]

7. And whereas every attempt to pursue privileges or benefits relates to item [2] in the previous question, in which there is an IMPLIED, QUID-PRO-QUO, or QUANTUM MERUIT CIVIL obligation associated with asking for and receiving the privilege by voluntarily pursuing the civil statutory status that DELIVERS that “benefit” or privilege.

  1. Quantum Meruit:
  2. Unjust Enrichment:
  3. Quasi-Contracts:

In summary, quantum meruit is often used to prevent unjust enrichment by ensuring fair compensation for services, while quasi-contracts are legal constructs used to address situations where no formal contract exists but fairness demands compensation123.

8. And whereas there is NO constitutional authority in the national constitution provided for the national government to OFFER public property or to USE that public property as a method to ENTICE people to surrender private property and private rights. Thus, it is PROHIBITED under the rules of statutory construction and interpretation.

9. And whereas every attempt to use or abuse PUBLIC property as a method to in effect BRIBE the public to SURRENDER private property and PRIVATE rights works a purpose OPPOSITE of establishing government, which is to PROTECT private property and PRIVATE rights by leaving them ALONE, and not taxing or regulating them. Thus, all such attempts to do so are UNCONSTITUTIONAL and not “governmental” in nature, but PRIVATE.

10. And whereas those procuring government privileges are required to be fully informed IN ADVANCE about the full cost associated with the quantum-meruit delivery of said privileges BEFORE they can acquire a valid obligation in connection with said delivery:

Requirement for Reasonable Notice, Form #05.022
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/ReasonableNotice.pdf

11. And whereas the public school system is structured to PREVENT receiving any possibility of reasonable notice of the obligations associated with requesting or receiving public property because statutory and constitutional law are not covered in over 95% of all public schools. Hence, “reasonable notice” is LEGALLY IMPOSSIBLE by any standard.

12. And whereas it is an abuse of the spending power of government to pay or transfer PUBLIC property or PUBLIC rights to PRIVATE parties. Thus, “benefits” and privileges can only be paid to PUBLIC OFFICERS on official business and never to private men and women.

“The power to tax is, therefore, the strongest, the most pervading of all powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people.  It was said by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of McCulloch v. Md., 4 Wheat. 431, that the power to tax is the power to destroy.  A striking instance of the truth of the proposition is seen in the fact that the existing tax of ten per cent, imposed by the United States on the circulation of all other banks than the National Banks, drove out of existence every *state bank of circulation within a year or two after its passage.  This power can be readily employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is no implied limitation of the uses for which the power may be exercised.

To lay, with one hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation.  This is not legislation.  It is a decree under legislative forms.

Nor is it taxation.  ‘A tax,’ says Webster’s Dictionary, ‘is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by government for the use of the nation or State.’  ‘Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the Legislature upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes.’  Cooley, Const. Lim., 479.

Coulter, J., in Northern Liberties v. St. John’s Church, 13 Pa. St., 104 says, very forcibly, ‘I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by authority of the government for the purposes of carrying on the government in all its machinery and operations—that they are imposed for a public purpose.’  See, also Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Pa.St., 69; Matter of Mayor of N.Y., 11 Johns., 77; Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch., 398; Sharpless v. Mayor, supra; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Ia., 47; Whiting v. Fond du Lac, supra.”

[Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 20 Wall. 655 (1874)]

13. And whereas there is no provision in the national constitution that authorizes the transfer of PUBLIC property and PUBLIC services to private individuals, nor any method provided therein to ABUSE such property or services to CREATE any new public officers who could RECEIVE said benefits or privileges. Thus, any attempt to do so is UNCONSTITUTIONAL and violates 18 U.S.C. §912 if the parties receiving said property are treated as public officers or subjected to civil statutory obligations that attach only to public officers by making them a target of CIVIL statutory enforcement.

“The term office’ has no legal or technical meaning attached to it, distinct from its ordinary acceptations. An office is a public charge or employment; but, as every employment is not an office, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between employments which are and those which are not offices…. A public officer is one who has some duty to perform concerning the public; and he is not the less a public officer when his duty is confined to narrow limits, because it is the duty, and the nature of that duty, which makes him a public officer, and not the extent of his authority.’ 7 Bac. Abr. 280; Carth. 479…. Where an employment or duty is a continuing [***65] one, which is defined by rules prescribed by law and not by contract, such a charge or employment is an office, and the person who performs it is an officer…. 

[Ricker’s Petition, 66 N.H. 207 (1890)]

14. And whereas failure or refusal by the government as MERCHANT (U.C.C. §2-104(1)) offering government property as a quantum-meruit exchange to give reasonable notice of the full cost of said property or services before such services are accepted renders the offer vague and unenforceable because the definitions and terms are undocumented and unnoticed in advance of LAWFUL acceptance.

15. And whereas government has a monopoly on the property or services it provides that makes any offers they make into unconscionable adhesion contracts that they can pile ANY and EVERY obligation they want on top of to receive said property or service.

“Adhesion contract.  Standardized contract form offered to consumers of [government] goods and services on essentially “take it or leave it” basis without affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired product or services except by acquiescing in form contract.  Distinctive features of adhesion contract is that weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms.  Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 4 Dist., 185 C.A.3d. 438, 229 Cal.Rptr. 828, 833; Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. Perkins, C.A.Or., 347 F.2d. 379, 383.  Recognizing that these contracts are not the result of traditionally “bargained” contracts, the trend is to relieve parties from onerous conditions imposed by such contracts.  However, not every such contract is unconscionable.  Lechmere Tire and Sales Co. v. Burwick, 360 Mass. 718, 720, 721, 277 N.E.2d. 503.”

[Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 40]

16. And whereas the the result of said government adhesion contracts are “unjust enrichment” forbidden under the law of equity.

Subject to these individual exceptions, the rule is that in classifying property for taxation some benefit to the property taxed is a controlling consideration, and a plain abuse of this power will sometimes justify a judicial interference. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269. It is often said protection and payment of taxes are correlative obligations.

[. . .]

 The proper use of legal fiction is to prevent injustice, according to the maxim “in fictione juris semper aequitas existat.” See Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189, 206. “No fiction,” says Blackstone, “shall extend to work an injury; its proper operation being to prevent a mischief or remedy an inconvenience, which might result from a general rule of law.” The opinion argues with great force against the injustice of taxing extra-territorial property, when it is also taxable in the State where it is located. Similar cases to the same effect are People v. Smith, 88 N.Y. 576; City of New Albany v. Meekin, 3 Indiana, 481; Wilkey v. City of Pekin, 19 Illinois, 160; Johnson v. Lexington, 14 B. Monroe, 521; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vermont, 152; Nashua Bank v. Nashua, 46 N.H. 389.

[Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 US 194 (1905);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14163786757633929654]

17. And whereas the “taxpayer” fiction works an injustice in the case of those who:

17.1 Want no government benefits or property or who want nothing more than what they EXPRESSLY ask for WITHOUT any of the other things bundled with it as an adhesion contract. In other words, for those

17.2. Seek no membership in any class or group such as “citizen”, “taxpayer”, etc. under any franchise or privilege that might cause a surrender or any right.

When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain. “A body politic,” as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, “is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and 125*125 has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, “are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things.” Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this day, statutes are to be found in many of the States upon some or all these subjects; and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against interference with private property. With the Fifth Amendment in force, Congress, in 1820, conferred power upon the city of Washington “to regulate . . . the rates of wharfage at private wharves, . . . the sweeping of chimneys, and to fix the rates of fees therefor, . . . and the weight and quality of bread,” 3 Stat. 587, sect. 7; and, in 1848, “to make all necessary regulations respecting hackney carriages and the rates of fare of the same, and the rates of hauling by cartmen, wagoners, carmen, and draymen, and the rates of commission of auctioneers,” 9 id. 224, sect. 2.

From this it is apparent that, down to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due process of law. Under some circumstances they may, but not under all. The amendment does not change the law in this particular: it simply prevents the States from doing that which will operate as such a deprivation.

[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]

18. And whereas there is no “compelling state interest” in delivering or procuring government property or services to a potential BUYER to:

18.1. Associate a potential BUYER of said property or service under U.C.C. §2-103(1)(a) with ANY civil statutory status, including but not limited to “individual”, “person”, “taxpayer”, “citizen”, “resident”, etc. if the BUYER merely signs a contract with the MERCHANT to pay a fully disclosed amount before the product or service is delivered.

18.2. Bundle the payment or acceptance of any OTHER government property or service in connection with said property or service. For instance, bundling under the term “wages” in 26 U.S.C. §3401(a) both “Social Security” and income tax, even though income tax is NOT a “benefit”.

19. And whereas the only reasonable motive for compelling the acquisition of civil statutory statuses in connection with transactions involving government property or services is to:

19.1 Implement and effect monopolistic behavior that destroys choice in the marketplace for said property or services and OTHER services the government wants to promote or expand AGAINST the wishes of the marketplace.

19.2. Interfere with the use or enjoyment of otherwise private property and private rights.

19.3. Undermine the very purpose of the bill of rights.

19.4. Work a purpose OPPOSITE of that for which it was created, which is to protect PRIVATE property and PRIVATE rights by leaving them along and not taxing or regulating them. Thus, to become an ANTI-GOVERNMENT or a DE FACTO government as described in;

De Facto Government Scam, Form #05.043
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/DeFactoGov.pdf

19.4. Completely destroy the most important private rights and thus make BUYERS of government services into government chattel or even CATTLE:

How to Leave the Government Farm, Form #12.020
https://sedm.org/media/how-to-leave-the-government-farm/

20. And whereas it its a violation of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine to compel the surrender of any constitutional right in the process of procuring government property of any kind. See:

Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises, Form #05.030, Section 28.3: Unconstitutional Conditions
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/Franchises.pdf

21. And whereas states of the Union are exempted from the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 because of the separation of powers (Form #05.023) and thus cannot be sued in federal court under said act, but ONLY when operating CONSISTENT with their organic law in a de jure capacity.

22. And whereas there is NO SUCH THING as sovereign immunity of any state that by its actions pursues or allows any violation of the right of private property protected by the Bill of Rights. See:

22.1. Najim v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 368 F. Supp.3d. 935 (2019)

22.2. Bank of the U.S., The v. The Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904, 9 Wheat 904, 6 L.Ed. 244 (1824)

“It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus, many states of this Union’ who have an interest in banks are not suable even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued.”

[Bank of the U.S., The v. The Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904, 9 Wheat 904, 6 L.Ed. 244 (1824)]

22.3. Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481, 501 (1833)

“Sovereign state” are cabalistic words, not understood by the disciple of liberty, who has been instructed in our constitutional schools. It is an appropriate phrase when applied to an absolute despotism. I firmly believe, that the idea of sovereign power in the government of a republic, is incompatible with the existence and permanent foundation of civil liberty, and the rights of property. The history of man, in all ages, has shown the necessity of the strongest checks upon power, whether it be exercised by one man, a few or many. Our revolution broke up the foundations of sovereignty in government; and our written constitutions have carefully guarded against the baneful influence of such an idea henceforth and forever. I can not, therefore, recognize the appeal to the sovereignty of the state, as a justification of the act in question.“

[Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481, 501 (1833)]

22.4 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). Notice the use of the word “People” instead of privileged domiciled civil statutory “persons”.

“Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while [some] sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the People, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. ”

[Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2131565438211553011]

22.5. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907)

“The government of the United States is one of enumerated powers; that it has no inherent powers of sovereignty; that the enumeration of the powers granted is to be found in the Constitution of the United States, and in that alone; …”

[Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5754716571668272141]

23. And whereas private corporations such as Microsoft and Google have been sued and LOST for implementing the SAME kind of “bundling” and “weaponization” that governmental programs employ with their SIMILAR franchises.

24. And whereas the commercial offering of government franchises and privileges within the exclusive jurisdiction of constitutional states that are under the protections of the constitution represents an INVASION of the national government into states of the Union that is clearly UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

United States Constitution
Article 4: States Rights
Section 4. Obligations of United States to States

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against [physical or commercial] Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

25. And whereas when any government enters the commercial marketplace to offer goods or services that involve DESTRUCTION of private property or private rights in order to pay for, it is operating in its PRIVATE capacity and may be sued just like any other private corporation under the Clearfield Doctrine.

See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) (“`The United States does business on business terms‘”) (quoting United States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926)); Perry v. United States, supra at 352 (1935) (“When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts [or franchises], it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference . . . except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent“) (citation omitted); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1877) (“The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf“); Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (explaining that when the United States “comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there“).

See Jones, 1 Cl.Ct. at 85 (“Wherever the public and private acts of the government seem to commingle, a citizen or corporate body must by supposition be substituted in its place, and then the question be determined whether the action will lie against the supposed defendant“); O’Neill v. United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 823, 826 (1982) (sovereign acts doctrine applies where, “[w]ere [the] contracts exclusively between private parties, the party hurt by such governing action could not claim compensation from the other party for the governing action”). The dissent ignores these statements (including the statement from Jones, from which case Horowitz drew its reasoning literally verbatim), when it says, post at 931, that the sovereign acts cases do not emphasize the need to treat the government-as-contractor the same as a private party.

[United States v. Winstar Corp. 518 U.S. 839 (1996);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8447843773469583325]

26. And whereas all such monopolistic practices in offering government property or services to implement “bundling” and “weaponization of government” have as their MAIN goal the destruction f private property and private rights, the Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny standard applies in which the LEAST restrictive means of delivering these property and services must be employed. That standard was first enunciated in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

27. And whereas the strict scrutiny standard involves imposing or enforcing discriminatory classifications, civil statuses, or obligations against a selected person often AGAINST their will, including but not limited to fictional franchises statuses such as “individual”, “person”, “taxpayer”, “citizen”, or “resident” in the case of the party who submitted this document to you.

28. And whereas the elements of the Strict Scrutiny Standard are:

The strict scrutiny standard is the highest level of judicial review used by courts to evaluate the constitutionality of laws or government actions, particularly those that affect fundamental rights or involve suspect classifications such as race or religion. To satisfy strict scrutiny, the following elements must be met:

  1. Compelling Government Interest: The government must have a compelling interest or objective for the law or action. This interest must be of utmost importance and necessary to achieve specific governmental goals.
  2. Narrowly Tailored: The law or action must be narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest. It means that the law should be designed to address the specific interest without being overly broad or affecting more people than necessary.
  3. Least Restrictive Means: The law or action must be the least restrictive means available to achieve the compelling interest. The government must demonstrate that there are no less restrictive alternatives that would achieve the same goal.

These elements ensure that laws or actions that significantly impact fundamental rights or involve suspect classifications are carefully scrutinized to protect individual liberties.

29. And whereas the Least Restrictive Means to deliver the products and services that people want is to:

29.1. Not bundle them with things that people do not want.

29.2. Define or classify the things requested as including other things, such as statutory “wages” in the case of 26 U.S.C. §3401(a).

29.3. Fully disclose the cost of the product or service ABSENT anything bundled with it.

29.4. Allow it to be paid for up front with an accompanying contract if necessary, to ensure that it is paid for in full BEFORE it is delivered.

30. And whereas every other private business has to deliver ITS products and services by the method documented in the previous step, there is no reason the government CANNOT or SHOULD not be required to follow the same protocol. This is ESPECIALLY true because in delivering most products and services it delivers, the constitution does not authorize it and therefore the government is operating on an equal footing with every OTHER private company and must follow the same rules ANYWAY.

31. And whereas NOTHING on any government form ever submitted by me may be construed in its CIVIL statutory sense but instead may be construed ONLY in the sense defined in the following OFFER:

Injury Defense Franchise and Agreement, Form #06.027
https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf

Thus, no application may be construed as an ACCEPTANCE of any kind of any government privilege or benefit.

32. And whereas because the ONLY thing that any document or correspondence may be construed as includes only what I define, then every interaction with any government then makes me the MERCHANT and never the BUYER. Only the owner of property can write definitions or rules that affect that property.

33. And whereas it is the DUTY of all real de jure governments to prevent involuntary changes to the status or civil status of those physically residing within its borders, whether domiciled there or not, including but not limited to changes in my status from PRIVATE, constitutionally protected to PUBLIC and statutorily protected under a franchise I don’t want any benefit from.

 every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract, the forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the rights and obligations arising from them, and the mode in which their validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced; and also to regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. 

[Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 ( 1878)]

 In all domestic concerns each state of the Union is to be deemed an independent sovereignty.  As such, it is its province and its duty to forbid interference by another state as well as by any foreign power with the status of its own citizens. Unless at least one of the spouses is a resident thereof in good faith, the courts of such sister state or of such foreign power cannot acquire jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of those who have an established domicile in the state which resents such interference with matters which disturb its social serenity or affect the morals of its inhabitants.

[Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal.App.2d 871 [Civ. No. 15818. Second Dist., Div. Two. Oct. 17, 1947]

Note that I do NOT claim the “benefits” of any CIVIL “citizen” status, but the same rules apply to those merely RESIDING but not DOMICILED therein.

34. And whereas because the government is the BUYER in all interactions with me, then I make all the rules, and especially choice of law rules, governing said interactions, which include the following:

Choice of Law, Litigation Tool #01.010
https://sedm.org/Litigation/01-General/ChoiceOfLaw.pdf

35. And whereas any and all attempts by any judge or government to interfere with the above choice of law rules is a taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment as well as a direct interference with my right of SELF-OWNERSHIP under the Thirteenth Amendment.

36. And whereas since there can be no ACCEPTANCE because I am INCAPABLE of acting as a BUYER of any government property or service, then any and all enforcement actions directed at me relating to the use or benefit of any government property or service are null and void.

37. And whereas the civil statutory codes implementing the franchise or privilege are unnecessary in the event of a real injury because all that is needed to pursue damages is proof of an injury to real private property in order to have standing under the common law.

38. And whereas my services or the use of my property are not free and are protected by the same rules of equity and unjust enrichment as the government’s.

“The State in such cases exercises no greater right than an individual may exercise over the use of his own property when leased or loaned to others. The conditions upon which the privilege shall be enjoyed being stated or implied in the legislation authorizing its grant, no right is, of course, impaired by their enforcement. The recipient of the privilege, in effect, stipulates to comply with the conditions. It matters not how limited the privilege conferred, its acceptance implies an assent to the regulation of its use and the compensation for it.”
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) ]

39. And whereas under the rules of equity, I have the same authority as government to implement bundling and unconscionable contracts as a DEFENSE against the SAME behavior by the government.

40. Now therefore, the following agreement represents a BILL for my services and the use of my property intended to undo any effects of participation in any government privilege or franchise and even to PUNISH the offering of said franchises, because they are NOT authorized by the constitution anyway.

Injury Defense Franchise and Agreement, Form #06.027
https://sedm.org/Forms/06-AvoidingFranch/InjuryDefenseFranchise.pdf

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