PROOF OF FACTS: “U.S source” does NOT include anything but payments DIRECTLY from the government and excludes even payments from “taxpayers”
1. Evidence and law:
1. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot authorize or license the VERY activity that is the subject of the current income tax.
“Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee. But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.“
[License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2852002685220457827]
Note that the current income tax is an excise taxable franchise upon the VERY subject that the supreme court held above cannot be taxed in a state: A “trade or business”, as described in:
The “Trade or Business” Scam, Form #05.001
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf
2. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified the income tax as “quasi-contractual”:
“Even if the judgment is deemed to be colored by the nature of the obligation whose validity it establishes, and we are free to re-examine it, and, if we find it to be based on an obligation penal in character, to refuse to enforce it outside the state where rendered, see Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 292, et seq. 8 S.Ct. 1370, compare Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641, still the obligation to pay taxes is not penal. It is a statutory liability, quasi contractual in nature, enforceable, if there is no exclusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by the common-law action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit. United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250, 31 S.Ct. 155; Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492, 46 S.Ct. 180; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227; and see Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 542; Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486, 493. This was the rule established in the English courts before the Declaration of Independence. Attorney General v. Weeks, Bunbury’s Exch. Rep. 223; Attorney General v. Jewers and Batty, Bunbury’s Exch. Rep. 225; Attorney General v. Hatton, Bunbury’s Exch. Rep. [296 U.S. 268, 272] 262; Attorney General v. _ _, 2 Ans.Rep. 558; see Comyn’s Digest (Title ‘Dett,’ A, 9); 1 Chitty on Pleading, 123; cf. Attorney General v. Sewell, 4 M.&W. 77. “
[Milwaukee v. White, 296 U.S. 268 (1935)]
3. A public office cannot be created MERELY by contract or quasi-contract:
“The term office’ has no legal or technical meaning attached to it, distinct from its ordinary acceptations. An office is a public charge or employment; but, as every employment is not an office, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between employments which are and those which are not offices…. A public officer is one who has some duty to perform concerning the public; and he is not the less a public officer when his duty is confined to narrow limits, because it is the duty, and the nature of that duty, which makes him a public officer, and not the extent of his authority.’ 7 Bac. Abr. 280; Carth. 479…. Where an employment or duty is a continuing [***65] one, which is defined by rules prescribed by law and not by contract, such a charge or employment is an office, and the person who performs it is an officer….”
4. It is a violation of Article 1 Section 10 of the Constitution for Congress to INTERFERE with the contracts between two otherwise private parties by INSERTING itself into the contract and making either or both parties into agents of the government engaged in a public office or agency against their will in order to collect revenue designed to FACILITATE the protection of such a contract. Certainly, reducing the consideration flowing between the parties either directly through withholding or indirectly through reporting and subsequent involuntary collection would work the same result.
Independent of these views, there are many considerations which lead to the conclusion that the power to impair contracts, by direct action to that end, does not exist with the general government. In the first place, one of the objects of the Constitution, expressed in its preamble, was the establishment of justice, and what that meant in its relations to contracts is not left, as was justly said by the late Chief Justice, in Hepburn v. Griswold, to inference or conjecture. As he observes, at the time the Constitution was undergoing discussion in the convention, the Congress of the Confederation was engaged in framing the ordinance for the government of the Northwestern Territory, in which certain articles of compact were established between the people of the original States and the people of the Territory, for the purpose, as expressed in the instrument, of extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, upon which the States, their laws and constitutions, were erected.
[. . .]
In the second place, legislation impairing the obligation of contracts impinges upon the provision of the Constitution which declares that no one shall be deprived of his property without due process of law; and that means by law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice. Contracts are property, and a large portion of the wealth of the country exists in that form. Whatever impairs their value diminishes, therefore, the property of the owner; and if that be effected by direct legislative action operating upon the contract, forbidding its enforcement or transfer, or otherwise restricting its use, the owner is as much deprived of his property without due process of law as if the contract were impounded, or the value it represents were in terms wholly or partially confiscated.
[Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 764-767 (1878);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17733919134422752358]
5. Even if ONE of the two parties to a contract between private parties through ignorance is deceived into representing the government as an agent called a “taxpayer”, they have no authority as such agent to compel the other party to reduce the consideration called for explicitly in the contract by donating any portion of it to the government in the form of “taxes” through their own unilateral action without at least making it an explicit provision of the contract.
6. The Internal Revenue Code is not enacted into positive law per 1 U.S.C. §204 legislative notes, but is a mere “prima facie presumption”. Presumptions, whether “prima facie” or not, which impair private rights are a violation of due process.
6.1. Thus, it is a mere PROPOSAL and OFFER to engage in what the U.S. Supreme called a “quasi-contract” that does not constitute admissible evidence of a legally enforceable obligation absent express or implied consent in some form. Thus it cannot and does not create any new public offices or property interests. Nor can it be called “law” until it has the FORCE of law by being enacted into POSITIVE law. Thus, it cannot form the basis for a “public office” or agency position as indicated in question 2 above.
‘It is apparent,’ this court said in the Bailey Case ( 219 U.S. 239 , 31 S. Ct. 145, 151) ‘that a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment. The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.’
[Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11805505800356608025]
6.2. The fact that something is “enacted” doesn’t make it positive law either, as in the case of the enactment of all major revisions of the Internal Revenue Code such as the Codes of 1939, 1954, 1986, etc. The phrase “enacted into positive law” must appear in these acts and it does NOT. It is therefore public policy disguised to LOOK like law:
“To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms.”
[Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1875);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11723983271266386879
6.3. Cases coming close to this issue are unpublished by the courts hearing them, because they don’t want the truth to get out on this issue. See, for instance:
6.4. More at:
Term Positive Law, House of Representatives
uscode.house.gov/codification/term_positive_law.htm
7. An act of CONSENT or COMITY which results in a civil obligation of any kind, INCLUDING a tax obligation, cannot implicitly obligate anyone OTHER than you unless you have express permission from the other party to do so. You have no authority by your own consent to obligate anyone OTHER than you. Every ONE and every THING OTHER than you is thus “foreign” and cannot be adversely affected by your act of consent or contract.
8. To affect another by your own actions, you need that other’s CONSENT in some form to obligate them. Otherwise, you are stealing their property, or their rights, which are ALSO property.
9. Filing hearsay information returns connecting anyone to the “trade or business” franchise under 26 U.S.C. §6041(a) therefore ALSO cannot adversely affect the civil status of another person or their property, not does it afford RELIABLE evidence proving that the filer is lawfully acting as an agent of the government and therefore a source within the United States federal corporation. That corporation is a FOREIGN corporation in respect to a constitutional state.
“lay legal conclusions [such as information returns] are inadmissible in evidence”
[Christiansen v. National Savings and Trust Co., 683 F.2d. 520, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1982)]“Generally, neither an expert witness nor a lay person may give testimony that amounts to a legal conclusion. Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d. 195, 217 (3d Cir. 2006); Hogan v. American Telephone Telegraph, 812 F.2d. 409, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1987) (lay opinion is not helpful if couched as legal conclusion); Christiansen v. National Savings and Trust Co., 683 F.2d. 520, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“lay legal conclusions are inadmissible in evidence”).
[Langbord v. U.S. Department of Treasury, CIVIL ACTION No. 06-5315, at *22 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2011)]
10. Any action by an alleged officer of the government that jeopardizes the safety or ownership of private property, whether by filing information returns, or engaging in presumptions about the status of the owner or the property, is a violation of the fiduciary duty of anyone working for the government who does this:
“As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. [1] Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts. [2] That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves. [3] and owes a fiduciary duty to the public. [4] It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual. [5] Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official which tends to weaken public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual rights is against public policy.[6]”
[63C Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees, §247 (1999)]
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] State ex rel. Nagle v Sullivan, 98 Mont 425, 40 P.2d. 995, 99 A.L.R. 321; Jersey City v Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d. 8.
[2] Georgia Dep’t of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d. 524. A public official is held in public trust. Madlener v. Finley (1st Dist) 161 Ill.App.3d. 796, 113 Ill Dec 712, 515 N.E.2d. 697, app gr 117 Ill Dec 226, 520 N.E.2d. 387 and revd on other grounds 128 Ill.2d. 147, 131 Ill.Dec. 145, 538 N.E.2d. 520.
[3]Chicago Park Dist. V. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d. 555, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d. 181, appeal after remand (1st Dist) 107 Ill.App.3d. 222, 63 Ill.Dec.134, 437 N.E.2d. 783.
[4] United States v. Holzer (CA7 Ill) 816 F.2d. 304 and vacated, remanded on other grounds 484 U.S. 807, 98 L.Ed.2d. 18, 108 S.Ct. 53, on remand (CA7 Ill) 840 F.2d. 1343, cert den 486 U.S. 1035, 100 L.Ed.2d. 608, 108 S.Ct. 2022 and (criticized on other grounds by United States v. Osser (CA3 Pa) 864 F.2d. 1056) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v Little (CA5 Miss) 889 F.2d. 1367) and (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in United States v. Boylan (CA1 Mass) 898 F.2d. 230, 29 Fed.Rules.Evid.Serv. 1223).
[5] Chicago ex rel. Cohen v Keane, 64 Ill.2d. 559, 2 Ill.Dec. 285, 357 N.E.2d. 452, later proceeding (1st Dist) 105 Ill.App.3d. 298, 61 Ill.Dec. 172, 434 N.E.2d. 325.
[6]Indiana State Ethics Comm’n v. Nelson (Ind App) 656 N.E.2d. 1172, reh gr (Ind App) 659 N.E.2d. 260, reh den (Jan 24, 1996) and transfer den (May 28, 1996).
11. Creating any scheme whereby owners of private property are enticed, slandered, coerced, or deceived into converting their property from PRIVATE to PUBLIC without consideration equaling the value of that property violates the above authority as well as the Fifth Amendment. This includes any attempt to raise revenue by doing so. It certainly includes:
11.1. Associating it with a privileged “trade or business“, which is defined as “the functions of a public office”, 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26).
11.2. “Effectively connecting” it without the INFORMED consent of the owner. 26 U.S.C. §864(c).
11.3. Deceiving the owners of private property into donating THEMSELVES to a public office through a “U.S. person” election and preventing them from learning of the conversion giving the “U.S. person” franchise office a confusingly similar name to that of POLITICAL citizenship.
11.4. Deceiving people into believing they have an obligation to pay a tax while refusing to produce the statute that EXPRESSLY makes them liable. There is NO such thing in the case of I.R.C. Subtitle A income taxes for anything other than withholding agents in 26 U.S.C. §1461.
The above techniques for DECEIVING honorable American nationals out of their money, and whose SUCCESS depends on them not knowing they volunteered is documented in:
How American Nationals Volunteer to Pay Income Tax, Form #08.024
https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/HowYouVolForIncomeTax.pdf
12. The act of using the above INVISIBLE elections to REMOVE private property from the protection of the physical constitutional state that it is located in through federal PREEMPTION thus DESTROYS the sovereignty of the state, kidnaps its citizens to serve a legislatively foreign government, and thus works a purpose OPPOSITE of the establishment of the government. It also constitutes an unconstitutional commercial invasion of violation of Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution by the very government charged with PREVENTING such a commercial invasion.
12.1. Charles W. Tyler & Heather K. Gerken, The Myth of the Laboratories of Democracy, 122 Colum. L. Rev. 2187, 2230 (2022)
“[W]herever [preemption] exists, federal law displaces state law, thereby ‘stifling state-by-state diversity and experimentation’ . . . .”;
12.2. Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1733, 1850 (2004)
“Preemption doctrine . . . goes to whether state governments actually have the opportunity to provide beneficial regulation for their citizens; there can be no experimentation or policy diversity, and little point to citizen participation, if such opportunities are supplanted by federal policy.”.
12.3. Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism’s Core Question 13, 17 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009)
“Citizens are often presumed to be able to participate more directly in policy making at the state level. Greater state autonomy to regulate will mean more opportunities for citizens to participate in governance and seek responsive government.”;
12.4. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2007)
“Federalism’s value, if there is any, lies in the often competitive interaction between the levels of government. In particular, a presumption against federal preemption of state law makes sense not because states are necessarily good regulators of conduct within their borders, but rather because state regulation makes Congress a more honest and democratically accountable regulator of conduct throughout the nation.”
13. It is a violation of state constitution and/or laws in most states for anyone to simultaneously act as a STATE public officer and a FEDERAL public officer at the SAME time. The reason is clear: It creates a harmful conflict of interest. Thus:
13.1. For a legislator, judge, or private party to act as pubic officers for the national government called “taxpayers” violates state constitution and state law and therefore CANNOT be used as a method of federal preemption or supremacy to enforce federal law in the state, even if that enforcement is limited to the “taxpayer” volunteer him or herself.
For a list of all the laws of every jurisdiction which contain a dual-office prohibition, see:
SEDM Jurisdictions Database, Litigation Tool #09.003
https://sedm.org/Litigation/09-Reference/SEDMJurisdictionsDatabase.pdf
Look under the subject: “Franchises: Dual Office Prohibition” under each jurisdiction.
13.2. The result of allowing dual franchise offices in states is called “impossibility preemption” as described by the Congressional Research Service:
Federal Preemption: A Legal Primer, Congressional Research Service
https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45825
14. American nationals are by default “nonresident alien” by virtue of the fact that the national government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state. They are therefore foreign in relation to “United States” as are all the people in their constitutional state.
14.1. Thus, earnings passing between two presumptively private people in the same Constitutional state cannot possibly be a “source within the United States”, no matter what either one of them ignorantly thinks or believes about what “United States” means.
14.2. Information returns can only be filed in connection with activities where BOTH parties to the transaction on both ends are “in the United States” federal corporation rather than geography. Neither “nonresident aliens” nor their activities are in the corporation called the “United States” and are beyond said jurisdiction and foreign to it. The fact that the FILERS of false information returns believe otherwise because they have not read the definition of “domestic” in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(4) does not change the real facts and circumstances of the nonresident alien nor place him WITHIN that corporation or make either HIM or the PAYER into a “source in the United States”.
14.3. IGNORANT and FALSE presumptuous beliefs and opinions are not admissible as evidence of a reasonable belief anyway pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 610. Beliefs do not change FACTS, and if a judge permits them to, he is establishing a state sponsored church where PRESUMPTION serves as a substitute for religious faith and doing so in violation of the First Amendment establishment clause.
“A foreign corporation is one that derives its existence solely from the laws of another state, government, or country, and the term is used indiscriminately, sometimes in statutes, to designate either a corporation created by or under the laws of another state or a corporation created by or under the laws of a foreign country.”
“A federal corporation operating within a state is considered a domestic corporation rather than a foreign corporation. The United States government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state.”
[19 Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Corporations, §883 (2003)]
The state-sponsored church unlawfully established by a judge who unconstitutionally permits presumptions that change beliefs into facts is exhaustively described in:
Socialism: The New American Civil Religion, Form #05.016
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/SocialismCivilReligion.pdf
15. People in states of the Union cannot bargain away their rights and liberties in a way that adversely affects public health and morals. This would certainly include pursuit of federal privilege of “U.S. person” that creates criminal financial conflicts of interest by those doing so by simultaneously holding state franchise office as a CIVIL “citizen” and federal franchise office as a CIVIL “citizen of the United States”:
“No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. The supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is continuing in its nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require. Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot divest itself of the power to provide for them. For this purpose the legislative discretion is allowed, and the discretion cannot be parted with any more than the power itself.”
[Butcher’s Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 753 (1884);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2843870813948488667]
16. Creating any national tax system that destroys the separation of powers and jurisdictions between state and national government constitutes a conspiracy against rights, since the purpose of the separation is to protect private individual rights:
We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See Art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote: “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This constitutionally mandated division of authority “was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Ibid.
[U.S. v. Lopez; 514 U.S. 549 (1995);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18310045251039502778]
“The leading Framers of our Constitution viewed the principle of separation of powers as the central guarantee of a just government. James Madison put it this way: “No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.” The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed.1961).”
[Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)]
“The determination of the Framers Convention and the ratifying conventions to preserve complete and unimpaired state [and personal] self-government in all matters not committed to the general government is one of the plainest facts which emerges from the history of their deliberations. And adherence to that determination is incumbent equally upon the federal government and the states. State powers can neither be appropriated on the one hand nor abdicated on the other. As this court said in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725, ‘The preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.’ Every journey to a forbidden end begins with the first step; and the danger of such a step by the federal government in the direction of taking over the powers of the states is that the end of the journey may find the states so despoiled of their powers, or-what may amount to the same thing-so [298 U.S. 238, 296] relieved of the responsibilities which possession of the powers necessarily enjoins, as to reduce them to little more than geographical subdivisions of the national domain. It is safe to say that if, when the Constitution was under consideration, it had been thought that any such danger lurked behind its plain words, it would never have been ratified.”
[Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295-296 (1936);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6690667556596791816]
17. There are NO LIMITS upon the tax that any Congress, and especially states, can charge for the benefits or privileges is offers. Thus, unjust enrichment by the government in delivering services is INEVITABLE if I ask for privileges and certainly inevitable if I don’t want any privileges, benefits, or services:
“The state’s power to tax is unlimited except as restricted by constitutional provisions. Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 93-0962, p. 2 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d. 694, 696. In contrast, local governmental subdivisions have only the power to tax that has been granted to them by the state constitution or the statutes.
[Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Got, 880 So.2d. 1 (2004)]
“In Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, 154 Tenn. 412, 429, 285 S.W. 570, 575, 47 A.L.R. 971, it was held that: ‘The Legislature has unlimited and unrestricted power to tax privileges, and this power may be exercised in any manner or mode in its discretion.’”
[Knoxtenn Theatres, Inc. v. Dance, 186 Tenn. 114 (1948)]
“The taxing power of a State is one of its attributes of sovereignty. And where there has been no compact with the Federal government, or cession of jurisdiction for the purposes specified in the Constitution, this power reaches all the property and business within the State, which are not properly denominated the means of the general government; and, as laid down by this court, it may be exercised at the discretion of the State. The only restraint is found in the responsibility of the members of the legislature to their constituents.”
[Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. 73 (1850)]
Unless restrained by provisions of the Federal Constitution, the power of the State as to the mode, form, and extent of taxation is unlimited, where the subjects to which it applies are within her jurisdiction.” State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319. See also Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 278; Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 1, 6; American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459, 463.
[Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920)]
2. Conclusions:
The evidence in this proof is consistent with the holding in the License Tax Cases, wherein the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot LICENSE an activity in a state in order to tax it. That case completed in 1866 and related to the FIRST income tax instituted in 1862 to fund the Civil War, by the way.
“Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee. But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But, it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it.“
[License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2852002685220457827]
Note that the current income tax is an excise taxable franchise upon the VERY subject that the supreme court held above cannot be taxed in a state: A “trade or business”, as described in:
The “Trade or Business” Scam, Form #05.001
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf
For the modern income tax, the Social Security Number functions for all intents and purposes as both a LICENSE and a regulation of state commercial activity, as described in the following article:
Social Security Administration “franchise” is the license number, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/history/ssa-franchise-is-the-license-number/
The ONLY thing the I.R.C. Subtitle A can reasonably regulate or tax is the use or consumption of absolutely owned property of the national government under Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 and not PRIVATE property. If it does regulate or tax PRIVATE property, it is an unlawful regulatory taking and an interference with commerce in the states of the Union just like the License Tax Cases above.
“When Sir Matthew Hale, and the sages of the law in his day, spoke of property as affected by a public interest, and ceasing from that cause to be juris privati solely, that is, ceasing to be held merely in private right, they referred to
[1] property dedicated [DONATED] by the owner to public uses, or
[2] to property the use of which was granted by the government [e.g. Social Security Card], or
[3] in connection with which special privileges were conferred [licenses].
Unless the property was thus dedicated [by one of the above three mechanisms by ONLY its OWNER and never the GOVERNMENT GRANTOR of the franchise], or some right bestowed by the government was held with the property [a RESERVED property interest such as Social Security in 26 U.S.C. §861(a)(8) or 26 U.S.C. §871(a)(3)], either by specific grant or by prescription of so long a time as to imply a grant originally, the property was not affected by any public interest so as to be taken out of the category of property held in private right.”
[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 139-140 (1876);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]
The burden of proof imposed on all those in government attempting to enforce the I.R.C. is to prove one or more of the following:
- Federal offices or federal property are lawfully involved, in fulfillment of 5 U.S.C. §301.
- That formerly PRIVATE property was CONSENSUALLY converted to PUBLIC property through a LAWFUL election.
- That I am SUBJECT to the CIVIL statutes involved, given that I don’t have a domicile within the exclusive jurisdiction of congress and have made no elections to become surety for an entity or fiction that is so domiciled..
In my case, neither of the above is involved and you as the moving party must satisfy the above burden of proof before you are lawfully entitled to my cooperation.
All the government shenanigans described on the his page work a purpose OPPOSITE that of establishing government to begin with: Protection of private property. The FIRST step in protecting private property is to keep it from EVER being converted to public property.
To suggest that I have to DONATE or convert all my PRIVATE property to government ownership before it or I can be protected is absurd. And to suggest that I must pursue or invoke a civil statutory fictional status in doing so is equally absurd. Would you hire a security guard if they insisted on OWNING all the property you want protected? NOT!
You don’t need to boss me around using a fiction such as “taxpayer” or “person” to protect my property. No other business can or does do that. The mere payment of an annual fee ought to be sufficient and nonpayment of the fee surrenders the right of protection. Thus, the system of government we have is fatally flawed and not only violates the purpose of its creation, but accomplishes the OPPOSITE purpose and is therefore a de facto government as described in:
De Facto Government Scam, Form #05.043
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/DeFactoGov.pdf
3. Further references
- Government Conspiracy to Destroy the Separation of Powers, Form #05.023
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/SeparationOfPowers.pdf - The “Trade or Business” Scam, Form #05.001
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf - Federal supremacy/preemption, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/federal-supremacy/ - FAQ: What EXACTLY is the “income tax” given everything posted on this site?, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/what-exactly-is-the-income-tax-given-everything-posted-on-this-site/