Journey to Sixteenth Amendment, Fed Reserve

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1. Introduction and Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment

At the turn of the 20th century, the industrial revolution took hold, leading to the need for higher taxes to build roads and infrastructure, which are expensive. There were also two world wars in Europe that were expensive to fight. As a method to pay for these expensive undertakings, then President Taft proposed the Sixteenth Amendment be added to the Constitution in the U.S. Senate. Here was his address to the Senate proposing it:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD  –  SENATE  –  JUNE 16, 1909
[From Pages 3344 – 3345]

The Secretary read as follows:

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

It is the constitutional duty of the President from time to time to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures, as he shall judge necessary and expedient.  In my inaugural address, immediately preceding this present extraordinary session of Congress, I invited attention to the necessity for a revision of the tariff at this session, and stated the principles upon which I thought the revision should be affected.  I referred to the then rapidly increasing deficit and pointed out the obligation on the part of the framers of the tariff bill to arrange the duty so as to secure an adequate income, and suggested that if it was not possible to do so by import duties, new kinds of taxation must be adopted, and among them I recommended a graduated inheritance tax as correct in principle and as certain and easy of collection.

The House of Representatives has adopted the suggestion, and has provided in the bill it passed for the collection of such a tax.  In the Senate the action of its Finance Committee and the course of the debate indicate that it may not agree to this provision, and it is now proposed to make up the deficit by the imposition of a general income tax, in form and substance of almost exactly the same character as, that which in the case of Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Company (157 U.S., 429) was held by the Supreme Court to be a direct tax, and therefore not within the power of the Federal Government to Impose unless apportioned among the several States according to population. [Emphasis added] This new proposal, which I did not discuss in my inaugural address or in my message at the opening of the present session, makes it appropriate for me to submit to the Congress certain additional recommendations.

Again, it is clear that by the enactment of the proposed law the Congress will not be bringing money into the Treasury to meet the present deficiency.  The decision of the Supreme Court in the income-tax cases deprived the National Government of a power which, by reason of previous decisions of the court, it was generally supposed that government had.  It is undoubtedly a power the National Government ought to have.  It might be indispensable to the Nation’s life in great crises.  Although I have not considered a constitutional amendment as necessary to the exercise of certain phases of this power, a mature consideration has satisfied me that an amendment is the only proper course for its establishment to its full extent. 

I therefore recommend to the Congress that both Houses, by a two-thirds vote, shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring the power to levy an income tax upon the National Government without apportionment among the States in proportion to population. 

This course is much to be preferred to the one proposed of reenacting a law once judicially declared to be unconstitutional.  For the Congress to assume that the court will reverse itself, and to enact legislation on such an assumption, will not strengthen popular confidence in the stability of judicial construction of the Constitution.  It is much wiser policy to accept the decision and remedy the defect by amendment in due and regular course.

Again, it is clear that by the enactment of the proposed law the Congress will not be bringing money into the Treasury to meet the present deficiency, but by putting on the statute book a law already there and never repealed will simply be suggesting to the executive officers of the Government their possible duty to invoke litigation. 

If the court should maintain its former view, no tax would be collected at all.  If it should ultimately reverse itself, still no taxes would have been collected until after protracted delay.

It is said the difficulty and delay in securing the approval of three-fourths of the States will destroy all chance of adopting the amendment.  Of course, no one can speak with certainty upon this point, but I have become convinced that a great majority of the people of this country are in favor of investing the National Government with power to levy an income tax, and that they will secure the adoption of the amendment in the States, if proposed to them.

Second, the decision in the Pollock case left power in the National Government to levy an excise tax, which accomplishes the same purpose as a corporation income tax and is free from certain objections urged to the proposed income tax measure. 

I therefore recommend an amendment to the tariff bill Imposing upon all corporations and joint stock companies for profit, except national banks (otherwise taxed), savings banks, and building and loan associations, an excise tax measured by 2 per cent on the net income of such corporations.  This is an excise tax upon the privilege of doing business as an artificial entity and of freedom from a general partnership liability enjoyed by those who own the stock. [Emphasis added] I am informed that a 2 per cent tax of this character would bring into the Treasury of the United States not less than $25,000,000.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Spreckels Sugar Refining Company against McClain (192 U.S., 397), seems clearly to establish the principle that such a tax as this is an excise tax upon privilege and not a direct tax on property, and is within the federal power without apportionment according to population.  The tax on net income is preferable to one proportionate to a percentage of the gross receipts, because it is a tax upon success and not failure.  It imposes a burden at the source of the income at a time when the corporation is well able to pay and when collection is easy.

Another merit of this tax is the federal supervision, which must be exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations.  While the faculty of assuming a corporate form has been of the utmost utility in the business world, it is also true that substantially all of the abuses and all of the evils which have aroused the public to the necessity of reform were made possible by the use of this very faculty.  If now, by a perfectly legitimate and effective system of taxation, we are incidentally able to possess the Government and the stockholders and the public of the knowledge of the real business transactions and the gains and profits of every corporation in the country, we have made a long step toward that supervisory control of corporations which may prevent a further abuse of power.

I recommend, then, first, the adoption of a joint resolution by two-thirds of both Houses, proposing to the States an amendment to the Constitution granting to the Federal Government the right to levy and collect an income tax without apportionment among the several States according to population; and, second, the enactment, as part of the pending revenue measure, either as a substitute for, or in addition to, the inheritance tax, of an excise tax upon all corporations, measured by 2 percent of their net income.

Wm.  H.  Taft

After the above proposal by then President Taft, debates on the Amendment ensued in the Senate. Below is the text of those debates from the Congressional Record:

Sixteenth Amendment Congressional Debates, Exhibit #02.007
https://sedm.org/Exhibits/EX02.007.pdf

2. The Proposed Amendment was a tax on THE GOVERNMENT, not Private Humans

Some people have asserted that it is deceptive to claim that the phrase above “shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring the power to levy an income tax upon the National Government” implies it is a tax upon the government. In retort, the following proves we are not only correct, but that the only real DECEPTIVE one was Taft Himself:

1. Taft could have said “shall propose an amendment to the Constitution conferring upon the national government the power to levy an income tax” but DID NOT state it more correctly this way.

2. The legislative implementation of what he proposed he described as an excise and a privilege tax ONLY upon corporations, which even after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, is EXACTLY and ONLY what the Sixteenth Amendment currently authorizes. These corporations are NATIONAL corporations, not STATE corporations, by the way.

“Income” has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth Amendment, and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed. Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335; Merchants’ L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 219.  After full consideration, this Court declared that income may be defined as gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital. Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207.  And that definition has been adhered to and applied repeatedly. See, e.g., Merchants’ L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka, supra; 518; Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527, 535; United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 169; Miles v. Safe Deposit Co., 259 U.S. 247, 252-253; United States v. Supplee-Biddle Co., 265 U.S. 189, 194; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 167; Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628, 633. In determining what constitutes income, substance rather than form is to be given controlling weight. Eisner v. Macomber, supra, 206. [271 U.S. 175]”
[Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174, (1926)]

3. The U.S. Supreme Court in Downes v. Bidwell agreed that the income tax extends wherever the GOVERNMENT extends, rather than where the GEOGRAPHY extends. Notice it says “without limitation as to place” and “places over which the GOVERNMENT extends”.

“Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, 5 Wheat. 317, 5 L.Ed. 98, was an action of trespass (or, as appears by the original record, replevin) brought in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia to try the right of Congress to impose a direct tax for general purposes on that District. 3 Stat. 216, c. 60, Fed. 17, 1815. It was insisted that Congress could act in a double capacity: in [****32] one as legislating  [*260]   for the States; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia. In the latter character, it was admitted that the power of levying direct taxes might be exercised, but for District purposes only, as a state legislature might tax for state purposes; but that it could not legislate for the District under Art. I, sec. 8, giving to Congress the power “to lay and collect taxes, imposts and excises,” which “shall be uniform throughout the United States,” inasmuch as the District was no part of the United States.  It was held that the grant of this power was a general one without limitation as to place, and consequently extended to all places over which the government extends; and that it extended to the District of Columbia as a constituent part of the United States.  The fact that Art. I, sec. 20 , declares that “representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective numbers,” furnished a standard by which taxes were apportioned; but not to exempt any part of the country from their operation. “The words used do not mean, that direct taxes shall be imposed on States only which are [****33] represented, or shall be apportioned to representatives; but that direct taxation, in its application to States, shall be apportioned to numbers.” That Art. I, sec. 9, P4, declaring that direct taxes shall be laid in proportion to the census, was applicable to the District of Columbia, “and will enable Congress to apportion on it its just and equal share of the burden, with the same accuracy as on the respective States. If the tax be laid in this proportion, it is within the very words of the restriction. It is a tax in proportion to the census or enumeration referred to.” It was further held that the words of the ninth section did not “in terms require that the system of direct taxation, when resorted to, shall be extended to the territories, as the words of the second section require that it shall be extended to all the [**777] States. They therefore may, without violence, be understood to give a rule when the territories shall be taxed without imposing the necessity of taxing them.”
[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)]

4. The fact that when former President and then Chief Justice Taft heard the FIRST case in the Supreme court after ratification, he stated that the liability for an income tax had NOTHING TO DO with one’s nationality or domicile! Cook, American national abroad in Mexico and domiciled there was outside the statutory geographical “United States”. Recall that the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276 (1932) held that domicile was the SOLE basis for income tax so Cook technically could NOT owe an income tax. But his litigation related to a 1040 return he previously filed in which he INCORRECTLY declared his status as that of a “U.S individual”. Thus, he made an ELECTION (consent) to be treated as a statutory “U.S. person” and thus ELECTED himself into a voluntary “taxpayer” office to procure protection of the national government while abroad. Notice he calls “protection” a BENEFIT, and thus a VOLUNTARY EXCISE TAXABLE FRANCHISE! Notice he says the SOLE BASIS in this case was the STATUTORY STATUS under the Internal Revenue Code of “citizen”, and not “domicile”. That civil statutory status and NOT Constitutional or Fourteenth Amendment status, we prove in How American Nationals Volunteer to Pay Income Tax, Form #08.024, is an OFFICE within the Department of Treasury who works for the Secretary of the Treasury.

“The contention was rejected that a citizen’s property without the limits of the United States derives no benefit from the United States. The contention, it was said, came from the confusion of thought in “mistaking the scope and extent of the sovereign power of the United States as a nation and its relations to its citizens and their relations to it.” And that power in its scope and extent, it was decided, is based on the presumption that government by its very nature benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and that opposition to it holds on to citizenship while it “belittles and destroys its advantages and blessings by denying the possession by government of an essential power required to make citizenship completely beneficial.” In other words, the principle was declared that the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found and, therefore, has the power to make the benefit complete. Or to express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, and was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen. The consequence of the relations is that the native citizen who is taxed may have domicile, and the property from which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country and the tax be legal — the government having power to impose the tax.”

[Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)]

5. The definition of “person” in 26 U.S.C. §6671(b) and 26 U.S.C. §7343 for the purposes of penalty and criminal enforcement purposes limits itself to government employees and instrumentalities of the government. The rules of statutory construction and interpretation forbid adding anything to these definitions not expressly provided, such as PRIVATE constitutionally protected men and women. Thus, anyone who doesn’t fall within the ambit of these definitions is, by definition, a VOLUNTEER because not a proper target of enforcement.

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F>CHAPTER 68>Subchapter B>PART I>Sec. 6671
Sec. 6671. – Rules for application of assessable penalties
(b)Person defined
The term “person”, as used in this subchapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.

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TITLE 26>Subtitle F>CHAPTER 75>Subchapter D> Sec. 7343.
Sec. 7343. – Definition of term ”person”
The term ”person” as used in this chapter [Chapter 75] includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs

6. The following memorandum of law proves that the only proper target of IRS enforcement are public officers WITHIN the government.

Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a “Public Officer” for Income Tax Purposes, Form #05.008
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/WhyThiefOrPubOfficer.pdf

7. The fact that “United States” is geographically defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10) as the District of Columbia and the CONSTITUTIONAL states of the Union are never mentioned. That place is synonymous with the GOVERNMENT in 4 U.S.C. §72 and not any geography.

8. The fact that the ACTIVITY that is subject to excise taxation within the Internal Revenue Code is legally defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) as “the functions of a public office”, meaning an office WITHIN the national and not state government. For exhaustive details on this subject, see:
The “Trade or Business” Scam, Form #05.001
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/TradeOrBusScam.pdf

9. The fact that the Federal Register Act and the Administrative Procedures Act both limit the TARGET of direct STATUTORY enforcement to the following groups, none of which include most people in states of the Union and which primarily consist of government employees only:

9.1. A military or foreign affairs function of the United States.  5 U.S.C. §553(a)(1) .

9.2. A matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.  5 U.S.C. §553(a)(2).

9.3 Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as officers, agents, or employees thereof.  44 U.S.C. §1505(a)(1).You can find more on the above in:

Challenge to Income Tax Enforcement Authority Within Constitutional States of the Union, Form #05.052
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-Memlaw/ChallengeToIRSEnforcementAuth.pdf

10. The fact that they can only tax legislatively created offices who work for them. See:

Hierarchy of Sovereignty: The Power to Create is the Power to Tax, Family Guardian Fellowship
https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Remedies/PowerToCreate.htm

11. The idea that governments are created to PROTECT private property, not steal it, and that taxation involves the institutionalized process of converting PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property without the express consent of the owner. Thus, the process of PAYING for government protection involves the OPPOSITE purpose for which governments are created—converting PRIVATE property to PUBLIC property, often without the consent of the owner, for the purposes of delivering the OPPOSITE, which is PREVENTING PRIVATE property from being converted to PUBLIC property! The Declaration of Independence declares that all just powers derive from the consent of the governed, and yet we make an EXCEPTION to that requirement when it comes to taxation? Absurd. So they HAVE to procure your consent to occupy a civil statutory office BEFORE they can enforce against you or else they are violating the Thirteenth Amendment and engaging in criminal human trafficking. For a description of just how absurd it is to NOT require consent to this office and to convert (STEAL) private property without the consent of the owner, see:

Separation Between Public and Private Course, Form #12.025
https://sedm.org/LibertyU/SeparatingPublicPrivate.pdf

12. A query of the ChatGPT-4 AI Chatbot confirms our analysis is correct:

So what the President proposed was an excise tax on the government itself, and nothing more.  This is important.   More on the history of the Sixteenth Amendment at:

1. Taxation Page, Section 13: 16th Amendment, Family Guardian Fellowship
   https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/taxes.htm
2. Great IRS Hoax, Form #11.302, Sections 3.8.11 and 3.8.12
   https://famguardian.org/Publications/GreatIRSHoax/GreatIRSHoax.htm
3. Great IRS Hoax, Form #11.302, Section 6.7.1: 1925: William H. Taft’s Certiori Act of 1925. President Taft’s SCAM to make the income tax INTERNATIONAL in scope by DENYING all appeals relating to it so the Supreme Court wouldn’t have to rule on the illegal enforcement of the income tax.
   https://famguardian.org/Publications/GreatIRSHoax/GreatIRSHoax.htm
4. The Law that Never Was, William Benson. Book about the FRAUDULENT ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.
5. Congressional Debates on the Sixteenth Amendment, Family Guardian Fellowship
   http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/History/Congress/1909-16thAmendCongrRecord.pdf

3. The Ratified Version of the Amendment

Below is the text of the Sixteenth Amendment ultimately approved:

U.S. Constitution
Sixteenth Amendment

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

[SOURCE: https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-16/]

The phrase “The Congress…” at the beginning of the Amendment indicates that the only “source” (property and not geography) taxed is what “The Congress” actually pays. And because they are the payor, they have a right to tax and regulate the use or consumption of their property under Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution. Recall that the Pollack case in 1894 identified the “TYPE” of property as “the source” that is in fact taxed, and not the GEOGRAPHY it is taxed in. 26 U.S.C. §861 and §862 try to obfuscate this fact by connecting taxation to a geography, but the underlying REAL but INVISIBLE source is the U.S. Government. The term “whatever source” in the amendment implies the property can be of any CLASS or TYPE, but the payor must always be the U.S. Government or its agents (“U.S. persons” or “effectively connected”). We can see that in how the tax is currently implemented as a tax on ONLY PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT property in 26 U.S.C. §864(b):

26 U.S. Code § 864 – Definitions and special rules

(b)Trade or business within the United States

For purposes of this part, part II, and chapter 3, the term “trade or business within the United States” includes the performance of personal services within the United States at any time within the taxable year, but does not include—

Thus, “trade or business within the United States” means exercising an office or status within the government in 26 U.S.C. §864(b). Personal services is a trade name from voluntary agency of the national government under the I.R.C. quasi-contract.

Authorities on “Personal services”, Family Guardian Fellowship
https://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/PersonalServices.htm

The above CIVIL “Person^PUB” rendering the “personal services” is the public officer described in 26 U.S.C. §6671(b) and 26 U.S.C. §7343 and it includes any ELECTING/CONSENTING “U.S. Person” engaged in the “trade or business” excise taxable franchise. It excludes “nonresident aliens” not engaged in the “trade or business” excise taxable franchise because they have not converted their civil status from PRIVATE to PUBLIC through any one of the following means:

1. “U.S. Person” election on the Form 1040.
2. A W-4 election on a Form W-4.
3. “Effectively connected” election on the 1040-NR.

26 U.S.C. §864(c)(3) then creates the presumption that income from ALL “U.S. SOURCES” is presumed connected with the national government and paid by the government.

26 U.S. Code § 864 – Definitions and special rules

(3) Other income from sources within United States

All income, gain, or loss from sources within the United States (other than income, gain, or loss to which paragraph (2) applies) shall be treated as effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.

The intent of the above provision seems to be that of taking away the “effectively connected” election process for nonresident aliens. But in reality, it’s just a reflection of the fact that all sources subject to tax are government/PUBLIC sources and that PRIVATE and therefore FOREIGN sources are therefore “purposefully excluded” per the rules of statutory construction and interpretation. The use of “shall be treated” certainly does not and cannot create a presumption that PRIVATE property can be treated as PUBLIC property without the consent of the owner. That would be a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The fact that the Sixteenth Amendment taxes GOVERNMENT/PUBLIC property paid by the government called a “U.S. Source” is the reason the government has to entice you into electing a PUBLIC status for either YOURSELF as a “U.S. Person” or your property as “Effectively Connected”.

The word “income” in the Sixteenth Amendment, like the original United States Constitution, means PROFIT, not ALL earnings or even “gross receipts”, and the Supreme Court has held that Congress can’t even DEFINE the word “income” in a constitutional sense:

“In order, therefore, that the [apportionment] clauses cited from article I [§2, cl. 3 and §9, cl. 4] of the Constitution may have proper force and effect …[I]t becomes essential to distinguish between what is an what is not ‘income,’…according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone, it derives its power to legislate, and within those limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised… [pg. 207]…After examining dictionaries in common use we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909, Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 34 S.Sup.Ct. 136, 140 [58 L.Ed. 285] and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185, 38 S.Sup.Ct. 467, 469, 62 L.Ed. 1054…”

[Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 9 A.L.R. 1570 (1920);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6666969430777270424 ]

An ENTIRE book has been written about the fact that CONSTITUTIONAL “income” means PROFIT and not GROSS RECEIPTS. This book is even written by a CONGRESSMAN! See:

Constitutional Income, Phil Hart
http://www.constitutionalincome.com

The result of the fact that CONSTITUTIONAL ‘income” is ALWAYS “profit” and NOT “gross receipts” is that if they ARE taxing gross receipts as they do on the 1040 form, then you had to CONSENT or ELECT to do so! There is NO OTHER WAY to approach this dilemma. “Gross income” means “gross receipts” for the purposes of the 1040 anyway. And by CONSTITUTIONAL “income”, we mean income earned by those STANDING on land protected by the Constitution, keeping in mind that the Constitution identifies ITSELF as “the LAW of the LAND”. Thus, people in possessions or abroad cannot earn “constitutional income”, because they are not protected by the Constitution in those localities. Thus, EVERYTHING that happens in those localities is a PUBLIC PRIVILEGE and not a PRIVATE right insofar as the national government’s involvement is concerned.

Indeed, the practical interpretation put by Congress upon the Constitution has been long continued and uniform to the effect 279*279 that the Constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest only when and so far as Congress shall so direct. Notwithstanding its duty to “guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government,” Art. IV, sec. 4, by which we understand, according to the definition of Webster, “a government in which the supreme power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by representatives elected by them,” Congress did not hesitate, in the original organization of the territories of Louisiana, Florida, the Northwest Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois and Wisconsin, and still more recently in the case of Alaska, to establish a form of government bearing a much greater analogy to a British crown colony than a republican State of America, and to vest the legislative power either in a governor and council, or a governor and judges, to be appointed by the President. It was not until they had attained a certain population that power was given them to organize a legislature by vote of the people. In all these cases, as well as in Territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi, Congress thought it necessary either to extend the Constitution and laws of the United States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants should be entitled to enjoy the right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the bill of rights.

[Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 278-279 (1901);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9926302819023946834]

The approved final version of the Sixteenth Amendment was also worded deceptively. Allow us to explain. There are only two types of taxes in the constitution:

1. Direct: A tax on PRIVATE PROPERTY that must be apportioned to each state on a capitation basis, meaning the same amount must be charged to each individual human.
2. Indirect: A tax on PROFIT DERIVED from PUBLIC property, such as licenses and franchises. Also called an “excise” tax in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution.

The approved/ratified Sixteenth Amendment was worded deceptively because:

1. Apportionment only pertains to DIRECT taxes on PRIVATE PRIVATE property. The current income tax is actually on PUBLIC property not PROTECTED by the constitution.
2. Since the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, U.S. Supreme Court:
   2.1. Has interpreted the Sixteenth Amendment as an INDIRECT tax.
   2.2. Has held that the Sixteenth Amendment “conferred no new taxing powers”. Why then was it even enacted? Stanton v. Baltic Mining, 240 U.S. 103 (1916).
3. Therefore, the phrase “without apportionment” was superfluous.
4. Because of this superfluous phrase “without apportionment” some lower courts have abused this phrase as an excuse to say the Sixteenth Amendment authorized a “direct unapportioned tax on property”. Thus, they are using it as an excuse to STEAL rather than merely PROTECT PRIVATE property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Based on how the courts have interpreted the amendment, the proper wording of the amendment should have been:

U.S. Constitution
Sixteenth Amendment

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect indirect excise taxes on incomes, meaning profit, from licenses or privileges that are PUBLIC property used in connection with activities and without regard to any census or enumeration.

The above corrected version of the Sixteenth Amendment is how it has been currently implemented. The SSN, TIN, and EIN is the LICENSE that is actually being taxed. There is a LONG history of taxing such licenses as an indirect excise tax. The case of License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 18 L.Ed. 497, 5 Wall. 462, 2 A.F.T.R. 2224 (1866) is an example of such a license tax instituted to fund of the civil war. The fact that they don’t call an SSN, TIN, ATIN, or EIN a “license” doesn’t mean it isn’t one. If it acts like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, its a duck.

The Sixteenth Amendment constrains what Congress can tax WITHOUT your consent. The income tax we have now for the most part currently DOES NOT implement the Sixteenth Amendment. Anything that involves YOUR CONSENT can BYPASS the constraints of the Sixteenth Amendment that the tax must be upon PROFIT. In fact, consent removes ANY POSSIBILITY that you can suffer any injury at all, so that consent or elections, in effect remove the ENTIRE protections of the constitution in the context of any civil status you consent to or any legal status you assign to your property that makes it public.

“Volunti non fit injuria.
He who consents cannot receive an injury. 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2279, 2327; 4 T. R. 657; Shelf. on mar. & Div. 449.”

[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856; SOURCE: https://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

4. The RESULT of the Sixteenth Amendment

All the Sixteenth Amendment really did was remove the apportionment requirement for taxes that were excise taxes listed in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution, by the admission of no less than the U.S. Supreme Court. At the time of Sixteenth Amendment Ratification in 1913, the things removed from the apportionment requirement would have been mainly PROFIT from personal property and not taxation of the property itself, because that type of property at the founding of our country only included real estate and capitation taxes:

“The legislative history merely shows that the words “from whatever source derived” of the Sixteenth Amendment were not affirmatively intended to authorize Congress to tax state bond interest or to have any other effect on which incomes were subject to federal taxation, and that the sole purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were otherwise taxable. 45 Cong. Rec. 2245-2246 (1910); id., at 2539; see also Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1916). ”

[South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 n.13 (1988);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2348693652139851544]

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Even when the Direct Tax Clause was written it was unclear what else, other than a capitation (also known as a “head tax” or a “poll tax”), might be a direct tax. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 596-598, 26 L.Ed. 253 (1881). Soon after the framing, Congress passed a tax on ownership of carriages, over James Madison’s objection that it was an unapportioned direct tax. Id., at 597. This Court upheld the tax, in part reasoning that apportioning such a tax would make little sense, because it would have required taxing carriage owners at dramatically different rates depending on how many carriages were in their home State. See Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, 174, 1 L.Ed. 556 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). The Court was unanimous, and those Justices who wrote opinions either directly asserted or strongly suggested that only two forms of taxation were direct: capitations and land taxes. See id., at 175; id., at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id., at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

“That narrow view of what a direct tax [on PROPERTY] might be persisted for a century. In 1880, for example, we explained that “direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate.” Springer, supra, at 602. In 1895, we expanded our interpretation [of DIRECT taxes] to include taxes on personal property and income from personal property, in the course of striking down aspects of the federal income tax. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108 (1895). That result was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct taxes. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–219, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).”

[Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12815172896965834886]

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“There is consensus on certain basic principles, in addition to the rule that the United States notion of income taxes furnishes the controlling guide. All are agreed that an income tax is a direct tax on gain or profits, and that gain is a necessary ingredient of income. See Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 34 S.Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. 285 (1931); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493 (1916); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920); Keasbey Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d. 894, 897 (C.A.3), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739, 64 S.Ct. 39, 88 L.Ed. 438 (1943). Income, including gross income, must be distinguished from gross receipts which can cover returns of capital. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185, 38 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed. 1054 (1918); Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d. 409, 414, 190 Ct.Cl. 19, 27 (1969); 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 5.10 at 35-36 (1969). Only an “income tax”, not a tax which is truly on gross receipts, is creditable.”

[Bank of America Nat. T. S. Ass’n v. U.S., 459 F.2d. 513, 517-18 (Fed. Cir. 1972); https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12199037144535776358]

That last quote above is deceptive: The point of reference in the constitution for whether a tax is direct or indirect is PRIVATE property, not PUBLIC property. A “direct tax” refers to PRIVATE property in the constitution, meaning YOUR property. It is inappropriate and deceptive to call a tax on PUBLIC property, such as a tax on PROFIT, a direct tax. It’s an INDIRECT excise tax because the property taxed was CONVERTED to public property by the licensing or election process of the activity SUBJECT to tax. For instance, the minute a “nonresident alien”:

1. Elects “U.S. person” status in 26 U.S.C. §7701 (a)(30) OR
2. “Effectively connects” in 26 U.S.C. §864(c) and thus becomes connected to a “trade or business in the United States” defined 26 U.S.C. §864(b) as “personal services” for the United States government.

. .Then the OWNER of the properly becomes PUBLIC and is removed from the constitutional protections for PRIVATE property. The property has thus been DONATED to Uncle Sam and converted from PRIVATE to PUBLIC.

The Sixteenth Amendment essentially EXPANDED the CONSTITUTIONAL/PRIVATE definition of “direct taxes” to include personal property and remove PROFIT from personal property from the apportionment requirement. The Bank of America Nat. case above mistakenly and deceptively labels the result a DIRECT tax ON THE PROFIT rather than the PRIVATE PROPERTY the profit derives from that is within constitutional protections. But it’s an INDIRECT tax on profit because they don’t want you to know that “income” from a constitutional perspective STILL means profit and not gross receipts.

Also, even BEFORE the Sixteenth Amendment, it has ALWAYS been the case that:

1. Government is just a business that delivers CIVIL and CRIMINAL protection. CIVIL is optional, CRIMINAL is not. The civil portion of that protection is classified as a “benefit” that creates an equitable obligation to PAY for the delivery of the “benefit”.
2. The ONLY “benefits” they can lawfully offer you are those listed in the Constitution if you are standing on land PROTECTED by said constitution. Nearly all the “benefits” the income tax pays for in fact are NOT expressly authorized by the Constitution and thus a usurpation to even offer within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state.
3. You have a right to REFUSE all CIVIL benefits (including domicile) to avoid the tax.
4. If you refuse all “benefits” they don’t have a right to charge or tax you for ANYTHING.
5. If you don’t have a right to REFUSE “benefits” and the obligations to pay the costs of delivering the benefits, we don’t need a Bill or Rights because at that point, government as a Merchant can charge WHATEVER THE HELL THEY want for their services, meaning that their power of taxation is completely unlimited. It becomes literally a mafia at that point.

Below is how we describe the above in the 1040NR Attachment, Form #09.077:

1. It is my right under principles of equity to reject any and all privileges and benefits in order to preserve my liberty and autonomy.

1.1. An offer of privileges I am legally unable to refuse or a prior acceptance I can’t revoke is little more than a criminal mafia enterprise and slavery disguised as government benevolence.  Alex De Tocqueville called this “soft tyranny”.  Remember the Godfather movie?:  “An offer you can’t refuse.”

1.2. “A person is ordinarily not required to pay for benefits which were thrust upon him with no opportunity to refuse them. The fact that he is enriched is not enough, if he cannot avoid the enrichment.” Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 Vand. L. Rev. at 1198 (1966). 
[Siskron v. Temel-Peck Enterprises, 26 N.C.App. 387, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975)]

1.3. “Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto. Any one may renounce a law [including a CIVIL FRANCHISE statute] introduced for his own benefit.”
[Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856; SOURCE: https://famguardian.org/Publications/BouvierMaximsOfLaw/BouviersMaxims.htm]

1.4. Rules of equity definitely apply to our interactions because:

1.4.1. Lawful money is no longer in circulation, and it has been replaced with fiat currency. 

1.4.2. Equity only applies where lawful money is NOT involved.

1.4.3. Principles of equity and unjust enrichment are frequently used in the enforcement of the tax franchise “codes”, and especially when presenting to juries.

1.4.4. If I can’t approach the government as a co-equal, then there is no real law and no legitimate government, because real law is BASED on equality of treatment. Excise taxable franchises such as the I.R.C. Subtitle A create and enforce inequality between the governed and the governors but they do so ONLY by consent of all parties concerned and I do not consent expressly nor do so impliedly by knowingly asking for and receiving any privilege.

[1040NR Attachment, Form #09.077, Section 3, Form 1, Standard IRS Form 8275; https://sedm.org/Forms/09-Procs/1040NR-Attachment.pdf]

On the above list the U.S. Supreme Court has held:

“As was said in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940), “[t]he simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.”

[Colonial Pipeline Co v Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 109 (1975);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16559630216409245512 ]

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The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civilized government, is exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person and property, in adding to the value of such property, or in the creation and maintenance of public conveniences in which he shares, such, for instance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools for the education of his children. If the taxing power be in no position to render these services, or otherwise to benefit the person or property taxed, and such property be wholly within the taxing power of another State, to which it may be said to owe an allegiance and to which it looks for protection, the taxation of such property within the domicil of the owner partakes rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax, and has been repeatedly held by this court to be beyond the power of the legislature and a taking of property without due process of law. Railroad Company v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262; State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Tappan v. Merchants’ National Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 499; Delaware &c. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341, 358. In Chicago &c. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, it was held, after full consideration, that the taking of private property 203*203 without compensation was a denial of due process within the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417; Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Massachusetts, 509, 519.

[Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 202-203 (1905); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14163786757633929654]

Per the above, the “benefit” or “privilege” you both ASKED for and RECEIVED from the government is the “compensation” required to render the taking through taxation lawful under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.

The following fascinating AI discovery confirms everything in the section and much more:

Microsoft Copilot: Government agency or office under the Public Rights Doctrine, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/microsoft-copilot-government-agency-or-office-under-the-public-rights-doctrine/

5. Why Sixteenth Amendment Indirect Excise Taxes are Voluntary

As a human being, you must VOLUNTEER/CONSENT to the income tax as documented in:

How American Nationals Volunteer to Pay Income Tax, Form #08.024
https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/HowYouVolForIncomeTax.pdf

Once you volunteer to be a public officer called a “person”, “taxpayer”, “citizen”, and “resident” there are NO LIMITS on what Congress can tax.

“The state’s power to tax is unlimited except as restricted by constitutional provisions. Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 93-0962, p. 2 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d. 694, 696. In contrast, local governmental subdivisions have only the power to tax that has been granted to them by the state constitution or the statutes.

[Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Got, 880 So.2d. 1 (2004)]

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“In Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, 154 Tenn. 412, 429, 285 S.W. 570, 575, 47 A.L.R. 971, it was held that: ‘The Legislature has unlimited and unrestricted power to tax privileges, and this power may be exercised in any manner or mode in its discretion.’”

[Knoxtenn Theatres, inc. v. Dance, 186 Tenn. 114 (1948)]

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SYLLABUS:

But the radical vice of this argument is, that the taxing power of the States, as it would exist, independent of the constitution, is in no respect limited or controlled [***74]  by that supreme law, except in the single case of imposts and tonnage duties, which the States cannot lay, unless for the purpose of executing their inspection laws. But their power of taxation is absolutely unlimited in every other respect. Their power to tax the property of this corporation cannot be denied, without at the same time denying their right to tax any property of the United States. The property of the bank cannot be more highly privileged than that of the government. But they are not forbidden from taxing the property of the government, and therefore cannot be constructively prohibited from taxing that of the bank. Being prohibited from taxing exports and imports, and tonnage, and left free from any other prohibition, in this respect; they may tax every thing else but exports, imports, and tonnage. The authority of “the Federalist” is express, that the taxing power of Congress does not exclude that of the States over any other objects except these. If, then, the exercise of the taxing power of Congress does not exclude that of the States, why should the exercise of any other power by Congress, exclude the power of taxation by the States? If an express power will [***75]  not exclude it, shall an implied power have that effect? If a power of the same kind will not exclude it, shall a power of a different kind? The unlimited power of taxation results from State sovereignty.

[. . .]

But it is said that a right to tax, in this case, implies a right to destroy; that it is impossible to draw the line of discrimination between a tax fairly laid for the purposes of revenue, and one imposed for the purpose of prohibition. We answer, that the same objection would equally apply to the right of Congress to tax the State banks; since the same difficulty of discriminating occurs in the exercise of that right. The whole of this subject of taxation is full of difficulties, which the Convention found it impossible to solve, in a manner entirely satisfactory. The first attempt was to divide the subjects of taxation between the State and the national government. This being found impracticable, or inconvenient, the State governments surrendered altogether their right to tax imports and exports, and tonnage; giving the authority to tax all other subjects to Congress, but reserving to the States a concurrent right to tax the same subjects to an unlimited extent. This was one of the anomalies of the government, the evils of which must be endured, or mitigated by discretion and mutual forbearance. The debates in the State conventions show that the [***84]  power of State taxation was understood to be absolutely unlimited, except as to imposts and tonnage duties. The States would not have adopted the constitution upon any other understanding. As to the judicial proceedings, and the custom house papers of the United States, they are not property, by their very nature; they are not the subjects of taxation; they are the proper instruments of national sovereignty, essential to the exercise of its powers, and in legal contemplation altogether extra-territorial as to State authority.

[Mcculloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9272959520166823796]

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SYLLABUS

Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce. The power to regulate implies the power to preserve. An unlimited power to tax is a power to destroy. A State cannot have the power to impair or destroy that which Congress has the power to preserve and regulate: therefore, a State cannot tax the instruments whereby Congress exercises its constitutional powers. 4 Wheat. 428, 432.

[. . . .]

OPINION

“The taxing power of a State is one of its attributes of sovereignty. And where there has been no compact with the Federal government, or cession of jurisdiction for the purposes specified in the Constitution, this power reaches all the property and business within the State, which are not properly denominated the means of the general government; and, as laid down by this court, it may be exercised at the discretion of the State. The only restraint is found in the responsibility of the members of the legislature to their constituents.”

[Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. 73, 82 (1850);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=853869643030493727]

[EDITORIAL: Taxation power can destroy so states can’t tax the federal government. However, states can literally DESTROY their own citizens and residents with NO LIMITS, according to the above!]

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“That a State may tax callings and occupations as well as persons and property has long been recognized. “The power of taxation, however vast in its character and searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the State. These subjects are persons, property, and business. . . . It [taxation] may touch business in the almost infinite forms in which it is conducted, in professions, in commerce, in manufactures, and in transportation. Unless restrained by provisions of the Federal Constitution, the power of the State as to the mode, form, and extent of taxation is unlimited, where the subjects to which it applies are within her jurisdiction.” State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319. See also Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 278; Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 1, 6; American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459, 463.

[Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18162597777315737322]

A discussion of the above can be found at:

Your Irresponsible, Lawless, and Anarchist Beast Government, Form #05.054, Section 11
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/YourIrresponsibleLawlessGov.pdf

Even the Sixteenth Amendment limit that the tax must be on PROFIT goes out the window beyond the point of consent, as documented in:

The Truth About “Effectively Connecting”, Form #05.056, Section 9
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/EffectivelyConnected.pdf

All forms of consent reduce to pursuing membership in some form of either you or your property in the collectivist group. Civil statuses and tax statuses merely IMPLEMENT and ENFORCE the RIGHTS surrendered in exchange for that VOLUNTARY membership and the CIVIL OBLIGATIONS that CAUSE those loss of rights.. Membership, in turn, produces a WAIVER of your rights:

When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations [consensual PRIVITIES] to others, he might retain. “A body politic,” as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, “is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” This does not confer power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v. R. & B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen [voluntary “social compact” club member but not NON-member/non-resident] to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and 125*125 has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, “are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say, . . . the power to govern men and things.”

[Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1877);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6419197193322400931]

What is currently taxed in the case of human beings who are VOLUNTARY CIVIL MEMBERS called “U.S. persons” is GROSS RECEIPTS minus whatever privileged deductions Congress decides to grant the peons volunteering to service the national debt. PROFIT has NOTHING to do with it in the case of human beings, but businesses are much closer than human beings to paying tax only on profit. The income tax was originally engineered to apply to privileged corporations, but corporate lobbyists have shifted that burden to human beings with sophistry in the tax code, the “trade or business” scam, and the “effectively connected” scam.

6. What do “derived from a source” and “income” mean in the Sixteenth Amendment?

The Sixteenth Amendment uses the phrase “whatever source derived” but doesn’t define what a “source” is. A “source” relates to the CLASSIFICATION of the property subject to taxation. There are three “sources”:

1. Real estate.
2. Capitation (people).
3. Personal property.

The first two above fit in the Direct Tax category under the original constitution. The LAST was added by the Sixteenth Amendment as a “source” as recognized in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012). That term “source” was inherited from an earlier case, Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (1895), declaring the income tax unconstitutional because it was implemented as a direct tax rather than the indirect excise tax that it currently is.

In 1895, the Supreme Court held a general income tax unconstitutional as an unapportioned direct tax, distinguishing it from a tax on business or employment income, which the Court described as a permissible excise (an indirect tax). Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (1895). In contrast, the Court held, in 1911, that a tax on corporate income was constitutional as a uniform excise—a type of indirect tax. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911). The Court reasoned that the original income tax applied directly to humans, while the corporate income tax applied through the corporate entity: humans might suffer the tax through higher prices or lower profits, but they would do so indirectly. In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment authorized an unapportioned tax on income “derived from a source.” The country adopted the Amendment to reverse the 1895 Pollock decision. Many later decisions have wrestled with the “derived” requirement. The best description requires income to constitute “an accession to wealth, clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has complete dominion.” Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass (1955).

The Sixteenth Amendment clarified that Congress could tax income regardless of its source, whether from labor, property, investments, or other means, without needing to apportion the tax based on state population. In that context. “source” refers to various types of PRIVATE property subject to taxation. So, “source” in this context doesn’t refer to a geographic location or legal entity—it refers to the category or origin of income, ensuring that all “income” types are within Congress’s taxing power. And by “income” we mean PROFIT and GAIN, not GROSS RECEIPTS as defined by the Constitution and NOT Congress.

“In order, therefore, that the [apportionment] clauses cited from article I [§2, cl. 3 and §9, cl. 4] of the Constitution may have proper force and effect …[I]t becomes essential to distinguish between what is an what is not ‘income,’…according to truth and substance, without regard to form.  Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone, it derives its power to legislate, and within those limitations  alone that power can be lawfully exercised… [pg. 207]…After examining dictionaries in common use we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909, Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 34 S.Sup.Ct. 136, 140 [58 L.Ed. 285] and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185, 38 S.Sup.Ct. 467, 469, 62 L.Ed. 1054…”

[Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 9 A.L.R. 1570 (1920):
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6666969430777270424]

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“…Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise scientific definition of ‘income,’ it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.”

[Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co. , 247 U.S. 179, 185, 38 S.Ct. 467 (1918);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1447070231071484109]

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“This court had decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to populations, as prescribed by the Constitution.  The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation…Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 55 L.Ed. 389, 31 Sup.Ct.Rep. 342, Ann. Cas.”

[Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 414, 58 L.Ed. 285, 34 Sup.Ct. 136 (1913);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11971357151204259952]

Not everything that comes in is “profit” and therefore “income” in a constitutional sense. A tax on OTHER than profit or even on GROSS RECEIPTS is a tax on CAPITAL, not “income”. Thus it would be a tax on OWNERSHIP of property (capital) and therefore a DIRECT TAX:

“We must reject in this case, as we have rejected in cases arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 (Doyle, Collector, v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 467, 62 L. Ed.–), the broad contention submitted on behalf of the government that all receipts—everything that comes in-are income within the proper definition of the term ‘gross income,’ and that the entire proceeds of a conversion of capital assets, in whatever form and under whatever circumstances accomplished, should be treated as gross income.  Certainly the term “income’ has no broader meaning in the 1913 act than in that of 1909 (see Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 416, 417 S., 34 Sup. Ct. 136), and for the present purpose we assume there is not difference in its meaning as used in the two acts.”

[Southern Pacific Co., v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335, 38 S.Ct. 540 (1918);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9702563774965412467]

7. How Courts unlawfully extend Constitutional “income” to include “gross receipts” rather than merely profit

We pointed out in the previous section that the constitutional definition of “income” means ONLY profit or gain. However, we must keep in mind that:

1. Not ALL “persons” subject to income taxation are protected by the Bill of Rights. Artificial entities such as corporations are not, for instance.
2. If you as a human being make a domestic election, you SURRENDER the protections of the Bill of Rights in exchange for privileges under the Public Rights Doctrine and the Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court. That domestic election could include:
   2.1. A “U.S. person” election by filing a 1040 return or
   2.2. An “effectively connected” election in filing a 1040NR return.
3. The definition of “gross income” in  26 U.S.C. §61 invokes the term “income”.
4. The I.R.C. never actually DEFINES “income“.
5. The constitutional definition of “income” cannot be changed by Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court.
6. Constitutional “income” means PROFIT because if it meant GROSS RECEIPTS it would be a direct tax upon PRIVATE property, which the U.S. Supreme Court also calls “capital”.

The above facts lead for a lot of gamesmanship on the part of the courts and the IRS. For instance:

1. They will try to CONFUSE or EQUIVOCATE which of the two contexts for “income” apply to a specific case before the court: CONSTITUTIONAL (profit) or STATUTORY (gross receipts for artificial entities). They don’t always overlap.
2. They will try to hide the fact that your domestic election to “U.S. person” status or “effectively connecting” made gross receipts taxable or HOW you can revoke the election with a foreign tax status. They may even try to gaslight people who point this out.
3. They will PRESUME that “income” means EVERYTHING you make as they did in Southern Pacific Co., v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335, 38 S.Ct. 540 (1918) to unlawfully enlarge your tax bill in violation of due process. All presumptions are a violation of due process unless you are party to a voluntary privilege. If you don’t call them on this violation of due process, you permit them to use your legal ignorance to increase your tax bill.
4. Courts have been known to use the word “direct” out of context so that the word refers to GOVERNMENT/PUBLIC property rather than PRIVATE property or YOUR property.
   4.1. The phrase “direct” or “indirect” in a constitutional sense refers to PRIVATE property owned by private people such as YOU. It never means GOVERNMENT/PUBLIC property.
   4.2. In this scenario, they refer to the income tax as a DIRECT TAX ON PROFIT, even though its an EXCISE TAX:
   “All are agreed that an income tax is a direct tax on gain or profits, and that gain is a necessary ingredient of income.”
   [Bank of America Nat. T. S. Ass’n v. U.S., 459 F.2d. 513, 517-18 (Fed. Cir. 1972); https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12199037144535776358]
   4.3. They do this to make it APPEAR that they have the power of DIRECT taxation in a constitutional sense even though it’s an AVOIDABLE and VOLUNTARY excise tax. Excise taxes are voluntary because you can avoid them by avoiding the activity subject to the tax. Direct taxes are INVOLUNTARY. They do this so they can fool you into believing that there is no way you can avoid the tax by revoking all domestic elections made usually by invisible consent.
5. Even in the case of nonresident aliens who made no domestic elections by not “effectively connecting” their earnings on the 1040NR, they will try to misapply 26 U.S.C. §871(a) against American nationals protected by the Constitution. Schedule NEC is for people not protected by the constitution, such as aliens abroad or American nationals abroad under a tax treaty. Those protected by the Constitution still have the following PRIVATE rights:
   5.1. Prohibition against direct taxes under Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3, and Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4.
   5.2. Protections of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine.

The Glenshaw case is a classic textbook example of item 3 above. It muddied the definition of “income” by making it appear as GROSS receipts rather than ONLY PROFIT, when in fact it did not. The parties to the Glenshaw case were state corporations who have no constitutional rights, but only privileges. These state corporations filed DOMESTIC tax returns as DOMESTIC officers WITHIN the United States government, in which their ENTIRE earnings were effectively PUBLIC property that Congress could tax ANY amount of. Thus, the constitutional “income” definition did not apply to the parties in the Glenshaw case and Congress could tax GROSS RECEIPTS, but only in the case of those NOT protected by the constitution because DOMESTIC and a “U.S. person”. Human beings standing on land protected by the constitution who do not make a DOMESTIC election, however, can only be taxed on PROFIT rather than GROSS RECEIPTS and the constitutional definition of “income” applies to them. ON this site, these people are called “nonresident aliens” not engaged in a “trade or business” with no “effectively connected” property. For further discussion of the Glenshaw case, see:

Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 358 U.S. 426 (1955)
https://ftsig.org/commissioner-v-glenshaw-glass-358-u-s-426-1955/

8. Sixteenth Amendment is IRRELEVANT to the Current I.R.C. Subtitles A and C

It may surprise you to hear that the current Internal Revenue Code Subtitles A and C COMPLETELY ignores the Sixteenth Amendment. In fact, it completely ignores the entire Constitutional taxing model of direct and indirect taxes. Here are the reasons:

1. “Income” from a constitutional perspective means PROFIT from a PRIVATE property perspective, and excludes CAPITAL or GROSS receipts.

That narrow view of what a direct tax might be persisted for a century. In 1880, for example, we explained that “direct taxes,” within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate.” Springer, supra, at 602. In 1895, we expanded our interpretation to include taxes on personal property and income from personal property, in the course of striking down aspects of the federal income tax. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895). That result was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct taxes. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189–219 (1920).

[National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 598 (2012);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12815172896965834886]

2. There are currently no taxes on strictly PROFIT from a PRIVATE perspective. Instead, the ENTIRE amount of “gross receipts” is entered on the tax return, which violates Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution as a direct tax. They HAD to do it this way because they can only regulate or tax PUBLIC property and can’t mix PRIVATE and PUBLIC on the same form. The very purpose of government is to PROTECT private property by never taxing or regulating it or mixing it with PUBLIC property, in fact. See:

Separation Between Public and Private Course, Form #12.025
https://sedm.org/LibertyU/SeparatingPublicPrivate.pdf

3. Yes, tax returns currently provide a method to take “deductions” which are all privileges by virtue of their connection to the “trade or business” excise taxable franchise under 26 U.S.C. §162. However:

3.1. The only thing Congress has delegated authority to write civil definitions or rules for are PUBLIC property, not PRIVATE property under Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2. This is because the only thing definitions can affect are property they own as the absolute owner. They don’t own PRIVATE property that is the CAPITAL portion of a payment, which is why they can’t define CONSTITUTIONAL “income” as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber.

3.2. 26 U.S.C. §162 deductions are PUBLIC privileges, not a deduction of PRIVATE capital, so they LOOK like an attempt to calculate profit but in fact are NOT. Technically, privileged deductions should only reduce the PROFIT amount that is PUBLIC, not the GROSS RECEIPTS amount that contains PRIVATE property.

3.3. Privileged deductions as they stand now are just a way of reducing the net tax for those FOOLISH and LEGALLY IGNORANT enough to donate their PRIVATE property to Uncle Sam through a “U.S. person” or “effectively connected” election and thus become a DOMESTIC “person” in temporary custody of PRIVATE property donated to procure benefits and privileges as a Buyer from the government as the Merchant under the U.C.C. That donation program is exhaustively described in:

How American Nationals Volunteer to Pay Income Tax, Form #08.024
https://sedm.org/Forms/08-PolicyDocs/HowYouVolForIncomeTax.pdf

3.4. The Supreme Court held in Eisner that Congress cannot even DEFINE “income” in a CONSTITUTIONAL context. Thus, they can’t define PROFIT in a CONSTITUTIONAL context EITHER, but that’s EXACTLY what they have attempted to do by introducing PRIVILEGED/PUBLIC deductions.

“In order, therefore, that the [apportionment] clauses cited from article I [§2, cl. 3 and §9, cl. 4] of the Constitution may have proper force and effect …[I]t becomes essential to distinguish between what is an what is not ‘income,’…according to truth and substance, without regard to form.  Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone, it derives its power to legislate, and within those limitations  alone that power can be lawfully exercised… [pg. 207]…After examining dictionaries in common use we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909, Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 34 S.Sup.Ct. 136, 140 [58 L.Ed. 285] and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185, 38 S.Sup.Ct. 467, 469, 62 L.Ed. 1054…”

[Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 9 A.L.R. 1570 (1920)]

PRIVILEGED deductions under 26 U.S.C. §162 are not available, however, in connection with PRIVATE property. 26 U.S.C. §864(c)(3) demonstrates this. It is repugnant to even tax or regulate PURELY PRIVATE/CONSTITUTIONALLY protected property. The purpose of establishing government is to PROTECT this property, not STEAL IT by taxing it and thereby converting it from PRIVATE to PUBLIC!

“The power to “legislate generally upon” life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the “power to provide modes of redress” against offensive state action, was “repugnant” to the Constitution. Id., at 15. See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903). Although the specific holdings of these early cases might have been superseded or modified, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), their treatment of Congress’ §5 power as corrective or preventive, not definitional, has not been questioned.”

[City of Boerne v. Florez, Archbishop of San Antonio, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) ]

3.5. In the case of “nonresident aliens”, 26 U.S.C. §864(c)(3) recognizes that the INCOME and LOSSES on the return are BOTH “effectively connected” with the “trade or business” excise taxable franchise, so even the income is privileged. That income would not be privileged if it was a true tax on PROFIT from a private perspective as used in the Constitution. We explore this further below:

PROOF OF FACTS: 26 U.S.C. 864(c)(3) does NOT make all government or “U.S. source” income “gross income”, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/proof-of-facts-26-u-s-c-864c3-does-not-make-all-government-or-u-s-source-income-gross-income/

4. Currently, the income tax in I.R.C. Subtitles A and C always involves DOMESTIC/PUBLIC property WITHIN the government.

4.1. It functions as “rent” for the use of PUBLIC/DOMESTIC/INTERNAL property and not a tax on PRIVATE property under the original Constitutional taxing model. Everything FOREIGN and PRIVATE is simply OUTSIDE the government. So the PRIVATE nature of property under Constitution that defines what a “direct tax” is is IRRELEVANT.

4.2. Recall that “government” itself is just a collection of PUBLIC property. The Constitution is a trust indenture to MANAGE that property. Its agent in doing that management is the United States Inc. corporation. That corporation manages the “corpus” of the trust. The rights that it legislatively creates and enforces are PUBLIC property. The offices it is manned by are its legislative creation and property. YOU have to VOLUNTEER to become its property and join the constitutional corpus to be managed or regulated or taxed by the corporation as its agent or officer.

What could be better than at tax on ONLY the government, friends!

5. Courts have invented their own definition of “direct tax” INDEPENDENT of the constitution to confuse things even further as shown in the example below. By doing so, they in effect are usurping legislative powers, because definitions are a legislative function:

“There is consensus on certain basic principles, in addition to the rule that the United States notion of income taxes furnishes the controlling guide. All are agreed that an income tax is a direct tax on gain or profits, and that gain is a necessary ingredient of income. See Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 34 S.Ct. 136, 58 L.Ed. 285 (1931); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493 (1916); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920); Keasbey Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d. 894, 897 (C.A.3), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739, 64 S.Ct. 39, 88 L.Ed. 438 (1943). Income, including gross income, must be distinguished from gross receipts which can cover returns of capital. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185, 38 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed. 1054 (1918); Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d. 409, 414, 190 Ct.Cl. 19, 27 (1969); 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 5.10 at 35-36 (1969). Only an “income tax”, not a tax which is truly on gross receipts, is creditable.”

[Bank of America Nat. T. S. Ass’n v. U.S., 459 F.2d. 513, 517-18 (Fed. Cir. 1972); https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12199037144535776358]

The reference point IN THE CONSTITUTION for whether it is DIRECT or INDIRECT is the PRIVATE property of the person taxed, not the PUBLIC property as PROFIT that is “excised” out of the transaction. So they are just muddying the definition of “direct tax” to take it out of the CONSTITUTIONAL context and invent a FRANCHISE/PUBLIC context to replace it with. This sophistry helps disguise the THEFT of your private property and protects the courts from the consequences of their unconstitutional actions.

6. According to Stanton v. Baltic Mining, the Sixteenth Amendment conferred NO NEW TAXING POWERS so it’s largely irrelevant to the way that taxes are currently calculated on a tax return as we point out above.

 But aside from the obvious error of the proposition intrinsically considered, it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged and being placed 113*113 in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it was — a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the income taxed. 

[Stanton v. Baltic Mining, 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1916);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=726253341774342162]

7. The income tax in a constitutional sense is an indirect excise tax upon the USE of PUBLIC/DOMESTIC property. That property are the statuses that Congress LEGISLATIVELY creates and owns, such as “U.S. Person”, “person”, and “taxpayer”.

“These general rules are well settled:

(1) That the United States, when it creates rights in individuals against itself, is under no obligation to provide a remedy through the courts. United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40; Ex parte Atocha, 17 Wall. 439; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188, 195; De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 431-433; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 212.

(2) That, where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive. Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174-175; Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U.S. 238; Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U.S. 555, 558; Farmers’ & Mechanics’ National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 35.

Still, the fact that the right and the remedy are thus intertwined might not, if the provision stood alone, require us to hold that the remedy expressly given excludes a right of review by the Court of Claims, where the decision of the special tribunal involved no disputed question of fact and the denial of compensation was rested wholly upon the construction of the act. See Medbury v. United States, 173 U.S. 492, 198; Parish v. MacVeagh, 214 U.S. 124; McLean v. United States, 226 U.S. 374; United States v. Laughlin, 249 U.S. 440. “

[United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13911914425951042261]

---

“The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the present cases, for it suffices to observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise “between the government and others.” Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 451, 49 S.Ct., at 413. In contrast, “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,” Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 51, 52 S.Ct., at 292, is a matter of private rights. Our precedents clearly establish that only controversies in the former category may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450, n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1266, n. 7, 51 L.Ed.2d. 464 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, supra, 285 U.S., at 50-51, 52 S.Ct., at 292. See also Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 894, 917-918 (1930).FN24 Private-rights disputes, on the other hand, lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.”

[. . .]

Although Crowell and Raddatz do not explicitly distinguish between rights created by Congress [PUBLIC RIGHTS] and other [PRIVATE] rights, such a distinction underlies in part Crowell’s and Raddatz’ recognition of a critical difference between rights created by federal statute and rights recognized by the Constitution. Moreover, such a distinction seems to us to be necessary in light of the delicate accommodations required by the principle of separation of powers reflected in Art. III. The constitutional system of checks and balances is designed to guard against “encroachment or aggrandizement” by Congress at the expense of the other branches of government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 122, 96 S.Ct., at 683. But when Congress creates a statutory right [a “privilege” or “public right” in this case, such as a “trade or business”], it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right. FN35 Such provisions do, in a sense, affect the exercise of judicial power, but they are also incidental to Congress’ power to define the right that it has created. No comparable justification exists, however, when the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation. In such a situation, substantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be characterized merely as incidental extensions of Congress’ power to define rights that it has created. Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts.

[Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1983);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17768408304219861886]

It’s a “rent an identity” service and the I.R.S. collects the rental fees for those who voluntarily adopt the PRIVILEGED/PUBLIC/DOMESTIC/INTERNAL identity. It’s just like a Costco Private Membership Association (PMA). The “rental fee” is calculated proportional to the “gross amount” of financial transactions voluntarily connected with the PUBLIC/DOMESTIC/INTERNAL status by the SSN/TIN/EIN franchise mark.

4 U.S. Code § 110 – Same; definitions

(c) The term “income tax” means any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by, net income, gross income, or gross receipts.

Attaching the SSN/TIN/FRANCHISE mark is MANDATORY for those with a DOMESTIC/PUBLIC status in the category of “U.S. person” (26 C.F.R. §301.6109-1(a)) or “person” (26 U.S.C. §6671(b) and 26 U.S.C. §7343) and OPTIONAL for those with a FOREIGN/PRIVATE status (26 C.F.R. §301.6109-1(b)). Those who avoid all the following are FOREIGN and PRIVATE and EXTERNAL and owe no tax per 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(31).

1. Domestic identity (U.S. person).
2. Connecting their private property to the franchise through “effectively connecting” it (Nonresident Alien). 26 U.S.C. §864(b) and (c) makes them “persons” (26 U.S.C. §6671(b) and 26 U.S.C. §7343) engaging in “personal services” because they are handling PUBLIC/DOMESTIC/GOVERNMENT property. “person” is an officer/agent of the U.S. Inc. DOMESTIC federal corporation.
3. U.S. government (DOMESTIC) payments such as Social Security that are mandatorily taxable in 26 U.S.C. §861(a)(8) and 26 U.S.C. §871(a)(3).

Since the income tax is a “rent an identity” service, there is no need for a liability statute for I.R.C. Subtitle A and C and there ISN’T one for anything other than WITHHOLDING agents on POLITICALLY foreign nationals born in foreign countries under 26 U.S.C. §1461. All you have to do is APPLY for or INVOKE the identity in any given year by simply FILING a tax return or withholding document. You can see this phenomenon demonstrated in spades in the following AI query:

Microsoft Copilot: Defeating the Public Interest Doctrine in Munn v. Illinois, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/microsoft-copilot-defeating-the-public-interest-doctrine-in-munn-v-illinois/

Lastly, the fact that the Sixteenth Amendment is irrelevant and that the current tax system under I.R.C. Subtitles A and C is a voluntary franchise for most people is a third rail issue that the government does not like talking about. If everyone knew they are volunteers, they would resign and where would that leave the government with such a large public debt? So the Sixteenth Amendment is just window dressing to lend the COLOR of legitimacy to a purely de facto system that exists today, as described in:

1. Microsoft Copilot: Are the government’s franchises lawfully executed under the U.C.C.?, FTSIG
   https://ftsig.org/microsoft-copilot-are-the-governments-franchises-lawfully-executed-under-the-u-c-c/
2. Microsoft Copilot: Meaning of civil statutory “services”, FTSIG
   https://ftsig.org/microsoft-copilot-meaning-of-civil-statutory-services/
3. De Facto Government Scam, Form #05.043
   https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/DeFactoGov.pdf

9. Alleged Fraudulent Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment

The alleged fraudulent ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment is a largely moot point because:

1. The amendment didn’t add any new taxing powers to Congress.
2. EXPANDED the definition of “direct tax” to include personal property and defined the income tax as a voluntary indirect excise tax.

An entire book was written about the fraudulent ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment authored by a former Illinois revenue collector, no less:

The Law That Never Was, William Benson, Constitutional Research Association
https://archive.org/details/lawthatneverwas0001bill
https://thelawthatneverwas.com/

For a commentary on the above book, see:

Wikipedia: The Law that Never Was
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Law_that_Never_Was#Benson’s_non-ratification_argument_ruled_fraudulent

Later, that Amendment went out to the states for ratification, culminating in ratification on February 3, 1913. See:

Sixteenth Amendment Annotated, Justia
https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-16/

9.1. No New Taxing Powers

The Sixteenth Amendment identified the income tax as indirect excise tax. Ultimately however, this was all political grandstanding because the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Amendment conferred “no new taxing powers”.

But aside from the obvious error of the proposition intrinsically considered, it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged and being placed 113*113 in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it was — a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the income taxed.

[Stanton v. Baltic Mining, 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1916);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=726253341774342162]

9.2. Expanded Definition of CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECT tax

In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sixteenth Amendment merely EXPANDED the types of property that require apportionment, rather than authorizing a DIRECT^PRI tax on PRIVATE property. To say “without apportionment” therefore implies taxes on GAINS (PROFITS) from ANY kind of property but not a tax on the PRIVATE property or its mere ownership.

Even when the Direct Tax Clause was written it was unclear what else, other than a capitation (also known as a “head tax” or a “poll tax”), might be a direct tax. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 596-598, 26 L.Ed. 253 (1881). Soon after the framing, Congress passed a tax on ownership of carriages, over James Madison’s objection that it was an unapportioned direct tax. Id., at 597. This Court upheld the tax, in part reasoning that apportioning such a tax would make little sense, because it would have required taxing carriage owners at dramatically different rates depending on how many carriages were in their home State. See Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, 174, 1 L.Ed. 556 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). The Court was unanimous, and those Justices who wrote opinions either directly asserted or strongly suggested that only two forms of taxation were direct: capitations and land taxes. See id., at 175; id., at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id., at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

“That narrow view of what a direct tax [on PROPERTY] might be persisted for a century. In 1880, for example, we explained that “direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate.” Springer, supra, at 602. In 1895, we expanded our interpretation [of DIRECT^PRI taxes] to include taxes on personal property and income from personal property, in the course of striking down aspects of the federal income tax. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108 (1895). That result was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct taxes. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–219, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).”

[Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12815172896965834886]

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10. Court Misrepresentations About the Effect of the Sixteenth Amendment

10.1. Public v. Private Taxation Background

Courts below the U.S. Supreme Court are presently misrepresenting the purpose and effect of the Sixteenth Amendment by describing it as a “direct unapportioned tax” rather than the “indirect excise tax” that the U.S. Supreme Court has always identified it as for over 100 years. They are doing so by the following methods of equivocation and deception:

1. Inventing or presuming a definition of DIRECT TAX they refuse to define accurately but which means a DIRECT^PUB tax on public property. In other words, a RENTAL of civil statuses Congress creates out of thin air.
2. Not identify the OWNER of the property subject to tax.
   2.1. A DIRECT^PRI tax is a CONSTITUTIONAL tax on YOU as the PRIVATE owner and requires apportionment.
   2.2. A DIRECT^PUB is an extraconstitutional rental of PUBLIC property owned by the national government.
3. Not identifying the CLASS of property subject to tax as either PUBLIC or PRIVATE.
   3.1. A DIRECT^PRI tax is a CONSTITUTIONAL tax on PRIVATE property owned by YOU and requires apportionment.
   3.2. A DIRECT^PUB is an extraconstitutional rental of PUBLIC property owned by Uncle.
4. Not identifying the context for the word “direct”: CONSTITUTIONAL or STATUTORY.

An explanation of the “PRI” and “PUB” superscripts at the end of the word “direct” above is explained in:

Writing Conventions on This Website, Section 2, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/introduction/writing-conventions-on-this-website/#2._Two

The above forms of equivocation are facilitated by the deliberate ambiguity and needless complexity of the tax code. That needless complexity is a product of the following two mutually exclusive approaches to taxation:

1. A tax on FOREIGN/PRIVATE property owned by people protected by the Constitution in states of Union ALONE.
   1.1. Legislation implementing this type of tax derives its authority from the CONSTITUTION alone.
   1.2. Implements a INDIRECT excise tax.
   1.3. Authority for this type of tax is Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 and NOT Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
   1.4. Described in Internal Revenue Code Subtitles B, D, and E.
   1.5. Implements FOREIGN AFFAIRS functions of the Constitution only.
   1.6. Applies throughout the country.
   1.7. Government is operating in its SOVEREIGN capacity under the Constitution against those who are CONSENSUAL members of the civil social compact, which is a Private Membership Association (PMA).
   1.8. Legislative acts implementing it must recognize private property and respect the division between PUBLIC and PRIVATE.
2. A tax on PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT/DOMESTIC property originating from statutes and NOT the Constitution.
   2.1. This type of tax is implemented ONLY with legislation and NOT the Constitution.
   2.2. Implements a DIRECT^PUB tax.
   2.3. Authority for this type of tax is Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 and NOT Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution.
   2.4. Described in Internal Revenue Code Subtitles A and C.
   2.5. Applies ONLY where the Constitution does NOT apply, such as abroad, within federal enclaves or unincorporated territory, or to consensual relations where constitutional protections have been voluntarily waived by contract or quasi-contract.
   2.6. Government is operating in its PRIVATE/COMMERCIAL capacity as a Merchant when implementing this type of tax within the exclusive jurisdiction of a constitutional state.
   2.7. Can only affect government/public property INTERNAL to the government and domestic.
   2.8. This type of tax acts as a rental fee of PUBLIC property leased to you in the form of civil statuses you ASK for.
   2.9. This is an EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL tax, meaning a tax not expressly authorized by the Constitution.

You can see equivocation in the Supreme Court between the above two types of taxation in the ruling below in order to OBSCURE which of the above two types of “taxes” they are talking about. The use of “STATUTORY context” below implies the PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT context in item 2 above and EXCLUDES the CONSTITUTIONAL/PRIVATE tax in 1 above. If the tax statutes in Title 26 ONLY IMPLEMENTED the CONSTITUTION as they are SUPPOSED to do and didn’t address places or scenarios where the Constitution does NOT apply, no such complexity or obfuscation would be necessary because the PRIVATE and PUBLIC contexts could and MUST have the SAME meaning. But because Title 26 deals with BOTH of the above types of tax, the situation gets confusing. They are just playing word games to steal from you as demonstrated below:

“The very essence of taxable income, as that concept is used in Section 22(a) [of the 1939 I.R.C. definition of “gross income”], is the accrual of some gain, profit or benefit to the taxpayer. This requirement of gain, of course, must be read in its statutory context. Not every benefit received by a taxpayer from his labor or investment necessarily renders him taxable. Nor is mere dominion over money or property decisive in all cases. In fact, no single conclusive criterion has yet been found to determine in all situations what is a sufficient gain to support the imposition of an income tax. No more can be said in general than that all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered. See Magill, Taxable Income (1945). ”

[Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 407 (1946);
SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12091298825335103420]

You can see how the above types of deception operate by reading the following article:

Microsoft Copilot: Is the income tax a DIRECT tax or an INDIRECT tax?, FTSIG
https://ftsig.org/microsoft-copilot-is-the-income-tax-a-direct-tax-or-an-indirect-tax/

10.2. Court Misrepresentations about the effect of the Sixteenth Amendment in reference to taxation of property

Today, the lower federal courts, instead of following the true, plain and clear controlling decisions of the high court in the CONSTITUTIONAL context, now instead cite inferior circular decisions of the Circuit Appeals Courts that reverse the original holding of the Supreme Court without any discussion of that opinion and without citing any text actually from it; – decisions like United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1990); Parker v. Comm’r, 724 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1984); Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1984) which simply cites to Parker to make its conclusion)(there are some other cases too). These inferior lower court rulings erroneously conclude that the Brushaber and Stanton v. Baltic Mining rulings in 1916, cited above, acted to uphold the federal personal income tax as a “direct tax without apportionment”, rather than to reject that argument, as was plainly and clearly done by the Supreme Court which declared the federal income tax to be an indirect tax under Article I, not a direct one under the 16th Amendment. To us, this seems to be an INDIRECT admission that the ONLY type of tax they are dealing with is the one in category 2 above. If they were honest, they would admit this, but there are no honorable judges left willing to publish their findings on the public record.

The rebellious lower courts today of course, completely reject indirect excise taxation as the constitutional basis of the federal income tax, and seem to have completely forgotten the original limited applicability of the pre-existing constitutional enforcement authority for the indirect taxing powers that are granted under Article I, Section 8, clause 1, i.e.: to tax by impost, duty and excise, and that are enforced under the enabling enforcement clause provided by Article I, Section 8, cl. 18, that existed in the Constitution before the adoption of the 16th Amendment. The lower courts also appear to have forgotten that it is in fact, the enabling enforcement clauses of the Constitution and the Amendments that actually empower the Congress to write law to enforce granted powers. They have forgotten that it is not the single clause (as in the 16th Amendment) that grants the power to be exercised that actually allows the enforcement through written law (as appropriate legislation) of the power granted, it is the associated enabling enforcement clause!

Direct taxes are taxes on PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERSHIP. For instance, a tax on the gross value of real estate. Indirect taxes are always voluntary and avoidable excise taxes on PUBLIC/GOVERNMENT property and privileges granted to and voluntarily exercised by you. If you don’t want to pay an indirect excise tax such as the income tax, simply avoid receipt or benefit of the PUBLIC PROPERTY that is the subject of the excise tax. Because governments don’t want you lawfully avoiding indirect taxes, they make the activity subject to tax rather nebulous. In the case of the current income tax, that activity is called a “trade or business“. That activity is a LICENSED activity connected to what the Federal Trade Commission calls a “franchise mark”. The SSN, TIN, ATIN, ITIN, and EIN serve that purpose:

“. . .a commercial business arrangement [e.g. a STATUTORY “trade or business” under 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)] is a “franchise” if it satisfies three definitional elements. Specifically, the franchisor must:
(1) promise to provide a trademark or other commercial symbol [e.g. the STATUTORY Social Security Number or Taxpayer Identification Number];
(2) promise to exercise significant control or provide significant assistance in the operation of the business [e.g. enforcement of the franchise “code” such as the Internal Revenue Code Subtitles A and C]; and
(3) require a minimum payment of at least $500 during the first six months of operations [e.g. tax refunds annually, deductions most Americans DO NOT need because of EXCLUSIONS in 26 U.S.C. §872 because not from GEOGRAPHICAL “U.S.”, stimulus checks, etc].”
[FTC Franchise Rule Compliance Guide, May 2008, p. 1;
SOURCE: http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus70-franchise-rule-compliance-guide]

---

“A franchise entails the right to operate a business [“trade or business”] that is “identified or associated with the franchisor’s trademark [SSN/TIN], or to offer, sell, or distribute goods, services [“personal services”], or commodities that are identified or associated with the franchisor’s trademark [SSN/TIN].” The term “trademark” is intended to be read broadly to cover not only trademarks, but any service mark, trade name, or other advertising or commercial symbol. This is generally referred to as the “trademark” or “mark” [SSN/TIN “mark of the beast”] element.

The franchisor [the government] need not own the mark itself, but at the very least must have the right to license the use of the mark to others. Indeed, the right to use the franchisor’s mark in the operation of the business – either by selling goods or performing services [personal services] identified with the mark [SSN/TIN] or by using the mark[SSN/TIN], in whole or in part, in the business’ [“trade or business”] name – is an integral part of franchising. In fact, a supplier can avoid Rule coverage of a particular distribution arrangement by expressly prohibiting the distributor from using its mark.”

[FTC Franchise Rule Compliance Guide, May 2008;
SOURCE: http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus70-franchise-rule-compliance-guide]

More on the above at:

About SSNs and TINs on Government Forms and Correspondence, Form #05.012
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/AboutSSNsAndTINs.pdf

It should be carefully noted that enabling enforcement clauses plainly do exist in Amendments XIII (13th), XIV (14th), XV (15th), XVIII (18th), XIX (19th), XXIII (23rd), XXIV (24th), and XXVI (26th). These Amendments to the Constitution are dated both before and after the adoption of the 16th Amendment, and therefore plainly show the intent of the authors of the 16th Amendment to intentionally NOT empower the Congress to enforce by legislation any new taxing power or any direct income tax without apportionment under the 16th Amendment, but instead, the absence of an enforcement clause in the 16th amendment is clearly intended to force the government to rely only on the pre-existing power to enforce law that is granted under the Article I, Section 8, clause 18 Necessary and Proper clause; – to enforce the income tax as one of the indirect taxing powers that are granted under Article I, Section 8, clause 1 (as impost, duty, or excise), where “income” is the measure of the Impost, Duty or Excise tax; – it is not the subject or the object of the tax imposed, it is the measure.

“Evidently Congress adopted the income tax as the measure of the tax to be imposed with respect to the doing of business in corporate form because it desired that the excise should be imposed, approximately at least, with regard to the amount of benefit presumably derived by such corporations from the current operations of the government. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107, 165, 55 S.L. ed. 107, 419, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 1312, it was held that Congress, in exercising the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as a franchise or privilege, was not debarred by the Constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income, although derived in part from property which, considered by itself, was not taxable. It was reasonable that Congress should fix upon gross income, without distinction as to source, as a convenient and sufficiently accurate index of the importance of the business transacted.”

[. . .]

“As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to be and is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. This court had decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to populations, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation, with certain qualifications prescribed by the act itself. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107 , 55 L. ed. 389, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1312; McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co. 228 U.S. 295 , 57 L. ed. 842, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419; United States v. Whiteridge (decided at this term, 231 U.S. 144 , 58 L. ed. –, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24.” Stratton’s, supra at 414

[Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, at 416-417 (1913); SOURCE: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11971357151204259952]

So we can see that a tax on the privilege of operating as a corporation “is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law”. So what we have now is NOT a constitutional income tax and has NOTHING TO DO with the Sixteenth Amendment or even Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution. It’s a usage fee for federal/PUBLIC property and privileges. Thus, it behaves as a “rent an identity” service. The usage fee is computed based on the “gross receipts” of the PUBLIC entity you are renting from Uncle Sam. To be even MORE precise exactly what you are renting: A corporation is a limited liability entity that shields the shareholders from personal liability, and corporate income taxes function in practical effect as “liability insurance”. A private human has both UNLIMITED liability and UNIMITED responsibility for him or her self under the common law and natural law.

10.3. Court misrepresentations that Sixteenth Amendment authorized a direct unapportioned tax

“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”

U.S. Const. amndt XVI

Direct taxes require apportionment. And the presence of the phrase, “… without apportionment among the several States …” seems to lead the reader to believe that 16A therefore NOW authorizes a direct NON-apportioned tax. But 16A doesn’t say that.

The following excerpt from the IRS’ “The Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments” adds fuel to that misunderstanding.

[F]or nearly a century, the Supreme Court has recognized that the sixteenth amendment authorizes a direct nonapportioned tax upon United States citizens throughout the nation, not just in federal enclaves.”

[Taliaferro v. Freeman, 595 F. App’x 961, 963 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal brackets and citation omitted)]

[‘The Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments, Section C.2;
SOURCE: https://www.irs.gov/privacy-disclosure/the-truth-about-frivolous-arguments-section-i-a-to-c]

Our response to the above:

1. We don’t believe there is one, let alone a century’s worth of Supreme Court jurisprudence that ever says what the 11th Circuit asserts above. I think that’s bad case law. Furthermore, F. App’x cases are unpublished opinions from the courts of appeals. These “unpublished” cases are considered to have limited precedential value—though Rule 32.1 of the FRAP allows citation of unpublished opinions for their “persuasive value.”
2. If a tax is levied through a franchise at home or abroad (Effectively Connecting, or a sovereign power levied on profits of aliens abroad (FDAP), and neither of those taxes constitute direct NON-apportioned taxes, then the phrase “… without apportionment among the several States …” serves a dual purpose.
   2.1. The phrase is another way of saying “the sixteenth amendment ain’t a direct tax.”
   2.2. For those unfamiliar with that analysis, it serves to confuse and lead towards voluntary compliance. A goal I believe the architects intended from the beginning.

Conclusion: The Sixteenth Amendment NEVER permits a direct tax anywhere or anytime.

11. The Federal Reserve

Following the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment on February 3, 1913, during the Christmas Recess in 1913 when all Congressmen had gone home, only six senators remained and they did not constitute a lawful quorum. They proposed and illegally ratified the Federal Reserve Act, giving birth to the fiat currency scam that plagues us today.

The Sixteenth Amendment had to be ratified first and eight months before the Federal Reserve Act, because when you are going to implement a fiat currency system, you need a way to regulate the supply of currency in the system. The income tax is the essential element for doing that so it had to come first with the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. That was the conclusion of a commission assembled by Ronald Reagan that published “The Grace Commission Report”.

An entire book has been written about the establishment of the Federal Reserve:

The Creature from Jekyl Island, G. Edward Griffin
https://archive.org/details/creaturefromjeky0000grif

12. Disestablishment of the Income Tax

In order to disestablish the income tax, the Federal Reserve system must therefore first be disestablished so that there is no more fiat currency supply to regulate. The current fiat currency system is described in:

The Money Scam, Form #05.041 (OFFSITE LINK)
https://sedm.org/Forms/05-MemLaw/MoneyScam.pdf

13. Conclusions

We will now summarize our understanding of the current income tax based on the preceding and in harmony with everything else on this website:

1. The only taxes under I.R.C. Subtitles A and C that have a liability statute are:
   1.1. “Withholding agents” under 26 U.S.C. §1461.
   1.2. “Employers” under 26 U.S.C. §3403.
   Every other HUMAN is a volunteer, except for the NRA^Aliens that the above Withholding Agents act upon under the authority of 26 U.S.C. §1441 and 26 C.F.R. §1.1441-1.
2. 26 U.S.C. §871(a) is a direct non-apportioned tax on property^PRI under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 in the case of NRA^Aliens.
   2.1. This tax IS compliant with the wording of the Sixteenth Amendment and is exercised as a sovereign power.
   2.2. This kind of tax is NOT mentioned in  26 C.F.R. §1.1-1 and thus is completely outside the “trade or business” excise taxable franchise. Notice the regulation mentions 26 U.S.C. §871(b) and 26 U.S.C. §877(b) but not 26 U.S.C. §871(a) and 26 U.S.C. §877(a).
   2.3. It is a “income” tax as STATUTORILY defined in 26 U.S.C. §110(c) but is not an “income tax” in a constitutional sense.
3. The only people subject without consent geographically internal to the United States^G are aliens standing on land protected by the Constitution.
   3.1. If they don’t get a green card, they remain NRA^Aliens, BUT they can be deported at any time.
   3.2. Once they elect a green card or remain more than 183 days under the presence test in 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1), they become franchisees. But this is technically not voluntary because they are doing it under compulsion of threat of deportation.
   3.3. THIS is ONLY true Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 tax, and it’s an excise rather than direct tax ALSO enforced as a sovereign power over foreign affairs under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3.
4. The franchise is EVERYTHING ELSE under 26 U.S.C. §871(b). And it’s a proprietorial power, not a sovereign power exercised over American nationals. See:
   HOW TO: How to distinguish “sovereign power” from “proprietary power” in the context of taxation, FTSIG
   https://ftsig.org/how-to-how-to-distinguish-sovereign-power-from-proprietary-power-in-the-context-of-taxation/
5. American nationals SUBJECT to the franchise waive constitutional protections by electing to participate, either impliedly or expressly, in exchange for a PRESUMED but not ACTUAL “benefit”.
   5.1. When they elect, they become domestic, within United States^GOV, and are described as part of “trade or business within the United States^GOV” in 26 U.S.C. §864(b) as either:
   5.1.1. “U.S. person” under 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(30)(A).
   5.1.2. “nonresident aliens” under under 26 U.S.C. §7701(b)(1)(B).
   5.2. By electing, they become lemmings jumping over the cliff and completely destroy the mandatory constitutional separation between public and private in exchange for collectivism. See:
   Separation Between Public and Private, Form #12.025
   https://sedm.org/LibertyU/SeparatingPublicPrivate.pdf
   5.3. Collectivism is the worst of all political evils so they have become “friends of the world” in biblical terms subject to the curse in Deut. 28:43-51 as described in:
   How Scoundrels Corrupted Our Republican Government, Family Guardian Fellowship
   https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/Evidence/HowScCorruptOurRepubGovt.htm.
6. The franchise is an income^PRI tax by consent not under the constitution as a proprietary power, or sometimes mislabeled as a sovereign^PRI power^PRI.
7. 26 U.S.C. §6012 imposes an obligation to file returns without mentioning “made liable”. Thus it can only obligate those who make a franchise election under 26 U.S.C. §864(b) by engaging in BOTH a “trade or business within the United States” and “personal services” simultaneously, meaning services as the CIVIL person who is the lawful target of enforcement in 26 U.S.C. §6671(b) and 26 U.S.C. §7343. Note that:
   7.1. BOTH “trade or business” and “personal services” always go together. You can’t have one without the other. They can’t reach the property without attaching it to a PERSON they created and own.
   7.2. “trade or business” and “personal services” are both intangible fictions. Both of them are nongeographical because they are intangible.
   7.3. You can’t mix GEOGRAPHICAL terms with FICTIONAL terms. It is NOT the same thing as “trade or business” in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26) PLUS “within the United States” in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9) and (a)(10).
   7.4. Thus, the only proper meaning for “trade or business within the United States” is within the corporation in connection with intangible personal services. That way, all terms mix because all are intangible. Otherwise, it would mix TANGIBLE and INTANGIBLE property
   7.5. “trade or business within the United States” in 26 U.S.C. §864(b) is a NEW TERM. They put the entire term in quote so its a NEW term: “trade or business within the United States”. The ONLY thing within the NEW term definition is “personal services”.
   7.6. They use the word “includes” in the definition of “trade or business within the United States” in 26 U.S.C. §864(b) because it encompasses “nonresident aliens” who “effectively connect” in U.S.C. §864(c).
   7.7. They are therefore talking about an ACTIVITY executed within the FICTIONAL “United States” corporation that is NONGEOGRAPHICAL.

14. Further Reading

More on the subject of this article at:

1. PROOF OF FACTS: That I.R.C. Subtitles A and C are NOT a CONSTITUTIONAL income tax but a CIVIL PRIVILEGE tax, FTSIG-proves that the Subtitles A and C income tax is on the government, and does not relate to private people or to Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.
   https://ftsig.org/proof-of-facts-that-i-r-c-subtitles-a-and-c-are-not-a-constitutional-income-tax-but-a-civil-privilege-tax/
2. Sixteenth Amendment Annotated-Justia
   https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-16/
3. Taxation Page, Section 13: 16th Amendment, Family Guardian Fellowship
   https://famguardian.org/Subjects/Taxes/taxes.htm#16th_AMENDMENT
4. Truth in Taxation Hearings, Section 6: Sixteenth Amendment
   https://truthintaxationhearings.famguardian.org
5. Sixteenth Amendment Congressional Debates, Exhibit #02.007
   https://sedm.org/Exhibits/EX02.007.pdf